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Standing to Challenge Administrative Action:
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief
Lee A. Albertt
A significant question in a society where courts are relied upon
to protect individual and group interests from unlawful government
infringements is who may obtain review of administrative action.
Voluminous litigation over the doctrine of standing and widespread
dissatisfaction with it by judges and commentators suggest that the
question has been a difficult one.' A good deal of the confusion is
attributable to a tradition which regards standing as a preliminary
question, distinct from the merits of a-claim.2 Such threshold doc-
f Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Professor Freund has testified that the concept of standing is "among the most
amorphous in the entire domain of public law." Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 498 (1966). In one standing controversy Mr. Justice Frankfurter de-
clined to attempt to articulate the concept beyond calling it "this complicated spe-
cialty of federal jurisdiction .... ." United States ex rel. Chapman v. F.P.C., 345 U.S.
153, 156 (1953). And Professor Davis characterized the older law of standing as "clut-
tered, confused, and contradictory .... ," 3 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.18
(Supp. 1965), and the newer rule as "cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial .. ,"
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-2 (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
DAIs TREATISE (Supp. 1970)]. Mr. Justice Douglas simply asserts that "[g]eneralizations
about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Association of Data Processing
Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
These difficulties are not for want of an ample literature on the subject: 3 K. DAvIS,
ADIMINimS-rnvE LAw TREATISE 208-94 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvIS TREATISEl; DAVIS
TREATISE 702-87 (Supp. 1970); K. DAvIs, ADAUNIMsATIvE LAW TEXT 419-39 (3d 6d. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as DAvis TEXT]; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
459-545 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL]; Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARv. L. REv.
633 (1971); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant]; Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When,
82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973); Scott, Standing In the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis,
86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Be-
havioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1972).
2. See pp. 436-38, 440-42 infra. See also Association of Data Processing Service Orgs.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 & n.1 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-06 (1968);
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 122-25 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BIcKEL];
S. Tnio, Locus STANDI AND JUDICIAL REvIEW 1-2 (1971); Scott, supra note 1, at 670-77;
Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MIcH.
L. REv. 540, 542-44 (1971).
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trines, which include political question, ripeness, and reviewability,
insure concreteness and adverseness in a case and maintain the in-
stitutional position of courts by regulating the availability and tim-
ing of review. They may characterize substantive issues as a basis
for deciding whether the issues are suitable for resolution,3 but they
do not adjudicate the claim. In an unripe case, for example, a court
may later decide the identical claim between the same parties. As
a member of this grouping, standing is seen to define the proper
occasions for adjudication of a claim.4
* A more illuminating way of looking at standing is to recognize
that its determination is an adjudication of familiar components of
a cause of action,5 resolved by asking whether a plaintiff has stated
a claim for relief. Thus substantive issues-injury, legal protection,
duty, and legal cause-rather than procedural or process ones are
presented. In this view standing does not focus on whether the cir-
cumstances are suitable for adjudication but on whether legal policies
are best served by providing or denying relief. Similarly the plain-
tiff's credentials or interests are not assessed as an isolated element
but as an integral part of the claim. There are no better or worse
plaintiffs, only those with or without a claim. This approach re-
veals the actual issues on which standing operates in a case, clarifies
the manner in which standing rules resolve them, defines the ju-
dicial task in deciding questions of standing, and allows an assess-
ment of the costs of resolving merit questions in this manner. This
article argues that standing is concerned with components of a cause
of action and should therefore be addressed under the law governing
claims for relief. It examines some of the reasoning underlying the
traditional access view of standing and contrasts with it merit ques-
tions common to standing in public law cases and cause of action
in private law cases. It then focuses on some particular problems
associated with reliance on private law rules. Next, sources of ju-
3. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Boyle v. Landry, 401
U.S. 77 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n
v. Gardner, 387 t.S. 158 (1967). See also Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 529-33 (1966); Vining, Direct Ju-
dicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 Mici. L. Rlv.
1445, 1522-29 (1971).
4. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 122-25; DAvis TEXT, supra note 1, § 22.04; C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTs 43 (2d ed. 1970); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, supra note
1, at 450; Scharpf, supra note 3, at 528-33; Scott, supra note 1, at 670, 689.
5. It should be emphasized that this is one view of standing and the functions it
performs. Had the tradition been to view standing as an aspect of claims it might be
more illuminating now to examine it as a threshold or preliminary doctrine. An analysis
of other threshold doctrines, which operate differently from standing, may show that
they relate to the merits in ways that similarly cast doubt upon their preliminary
status. For a suggestive beginning regarding ripeness, see Vining, supra note 3, at 1522-29.
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dicial power and criteria for formulating rules governing claims
against the government including third-party practices are explored.
The article concludes with an examination of the implications of
a law of claims for two significant developments in the law of ju-
dicial review-public interest standing and the Supreme Court's new
zone of interest test.
I. Access Standing and Merit Questions
Standing traditionally has been regarded as an access barrier con-
cerned with one's credentials to bring suit. It is what entitles one
to obtain an adjudication and thus confers a right to review but not
necessarily to relief. 6 The typical claim of a plaintiff challenging
agency action, that the agency has exceeded statutory authority or
abused its discretion, underscores the merit-threshold distinction. The
Court's resolution of these issues appears to be the "merits"; the re-
mainder therefore is preliminary to this decision.
Two issues have been involved in determining whether a litigant
has standing to obtain review of administrative action. The first, as-
sociated with the personal interest requirement of case or contro-
versy in Article III of the Constitution,7 requires injury to the
litigant from the action he challenges. It is said to ensure the proper
occasions and conditions for adjudication, a view the Court has en-
dorsed in stating that "the gist of the question of standing" is whether
the party seeking relief "has alleged such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.""
Although blended with discussions of Article III injury and seen
6. See DAVIS TEXT, supra note 1, § 22.07; 3 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 1, § 22.04;
Jaffe, Standing Again, supra note I; Lewis, Constitutional Rights and Misuse of Standing,
14 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1962). See also S. THIO, supra note 2, at 1-5; cf. C. WRIGHT, supra
note 4. § 13; Comment, supra note 2, at 540-45.
7. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
The requirement can be traced back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), where the judicial power to deal with constitutionality was a necessary in-
cident of adjudicating the actual interests and legal rights of litigants. See generally
BICKEL, supra note 2, at 114-17; H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL
Lxw 9-10 (1961). But cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), in which the Court
chose to rely on the injury requirement of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); BICKEL, supra note 2, at 119-22;
Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 15-16.
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to serve similar functions,9 the second requirement has been distinct:
A litigant must have a legally protected interest or "legal interest
standing."' 0 This has been the principal source of controversy in dis-
putes over standing and it arises primarily when a plaintiff ques-
tions administrative action.
Both these components, however, are more profitably viewed as
dealing with a set of issues respecting the legal relationship of the
parties that are familiar merit questions. Administrative action, for
example, may contravene a variety of statutory, constitutional, or
judge-made legal provisions, and may impinge directly or indirectly
upon many interests. These interests may be highly personal, be-
longing to one or several individuals, or they may be shared in com-
mon with a group of persons. The extent of infringement may range
from the imperceptible to the gross. Finally, there may or may not
be a statute providing for judicial review at the request of a desig-
nated class. These variables-the amount, kind, and directness of
injury, the type of interests infringed, and the legal provisions on
which one relies-are factors which courts routinely take into account
in deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action.
In private as well as public law, courts are asked to decide when
and for whom concededly harmful and unlawful conduct is reme-
diable. In determining who may obtain relief courts are passing
upon a matter of substantive law, such as contract or tort, and are
ruling on whether a cause of action exists. They do so by looking to
such questions as the defendant's duty in the circumstances, the di-
rectness of injury, proximate cause, and the consequences of liability.
This is the inquiry and subject matter of standing in public law
cases and the question of claim for relief in private law cases.
Standing, in looking to injury or recognizable harm, quite obvious-
ly deals with an essential element of a claim. In addressing protected
legal interest it poses the counterpart of familiar private claim ques-
9. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 2, at 115-22; Scharpf, supra note 3; Scott, supra note
1, at 669-77, 683-85.
10. Legal interest standing was summarized by Mr. justice Frankfurter:
A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort that,
if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the
courts. . .. Or standing may be based upon an interest created by the Constitution
or a statute. . . . But if no comparable common-law right exists and no such con-
stitutional' or statutory interest has been created, relief is not available judicially.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
Cases finding no legal interest invoke and rely on those concerning Article III standing.
See L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R.R., 311 U.S. 295 (1940); Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118
(1939); Rural Elec. Admin. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966).
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tions: whether the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, whether
he had an obligation to act or refrain from acting in certain ways,
and whether his conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.
All of these are matters concerned with whether a plaintiff has stated
a claim for relief; they are resolved by reference to the meaning and
purposes of the law relevant to the merits. The answer to the ques-
tion who may sue is a by-product of this determination.
Central to the development of legal interest standing is the dis-
tinction between statutory and nonstatutory review. Statutory review
refers to an action brought pursuant to a statute specifically providing
for review of actions or orders of an agency," usually referring broad-
ly to those who may seek review as "any party in interest" or "a
person aggrieved or adversely affected."'12 Absent such a provision,
review is sought in an original action brought in a district court un-
der a more general jurisdictional grant.13
A. Legal Interest in Statutory Review Cases
The approach to legal interest standing in cases of statutory re-
view, developed in the 1920's, was quite straightforward. Since the
alleged injury was usually economic and therefore clearly recogniz-
11. Specific statutory review is based on a provision that orders or actions of the
agency may be reviewed; general statutory review on a broad provision for review of
administrative action. The terms "statutory" and "nonstatutory" are not used in any
technical sense, since all proceedings in federal courts rest upon some statute. But
the distinction is a useful one. See generally Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative
Agencies in Indiana, 28 INDIANA L.J. 1 (1952).
12. These are not terms of art. For example, any aggrieved party to proceedings un-
der the Federal Power Act may seek review. 16 U.S.C. § 825(l)(b) (1970). Under the
Federal Aviation Act "any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order" may
obtain review. 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970), see Transcontinental Bus Sys. v. C.A.B.,
383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). "Any party in interest,"
or "any person aggrieved" or "adversely affected" are found in the Interstate Com-
merce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970); National Labor Relations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a)
(1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) (1970), and Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970). The Federal Trade Commission Act
is narrower. It provides for review by "[ajny person . . . required by an order of the
Commission to cease and desist.... " 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
13. Most often jurisdiction will be based upon provisions of United States Code
title 28, such as § 1331, the general "federal question" jurisdictional grant, or §§ 1337
and 1329, which confer jurisdiction over civil actions arising under acts "regulating
commerce" or "relating to the postal service." Occasionally one may utilize a juris-
dictional provision enacted as part of the substantive statute, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1329.
(1970). The plaintiff seeking nonstatutory review may encounter a variety of obstacles
which are not applicable to statutory proceedings. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947);
Empresa Hondurena De Vapores v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962), vacated
sub nom. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 272 U.S. 10
(1963). See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus Venue Act of 1962
and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L. Rv.
308 (1967); Crampton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The
Need For Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and
Parties Defendant, 68 Micii. L. REv. 587 (1970).
429
The Yale Law Journal
able, the only issue was whether the plaintiff's interest was protected
by the regulatory program under which review was sought. If the
purposes and policies of the statute established a duty on the part
of the agency toward the complainant which had been disregarded
without sufficient reason, the plaintiff was entitled to relief.
Illustrative of this approach is a trilogy of Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) cases in which the basic statutory review provision
did not refer to specific parties. 14 The first, Edward Hines Yellow
Pine Trustees v. United States,'5 denied standing to a manufac-
turer of lumber complaining of an ICC order requiring a railroad
to discontinue storage charges on lumber allowed to remain in cars
after arrival at destination. Imposed during the First World War
because of a car shortage, no longer found to exist, the charge fa-
vored manufacturers not utilizing storage, such as the plaintiff, as
against those who did. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who wrote for the Court
in all three cases, ruled that the elimination of this advantage was
not legal injury to the plaintiff, whose "right [was] limited to pro-
tection against unjust discrimination."' 6 Only the carrier railroad
had a protected interest under the Interstate Commerce Act against
this change.
In the Chicago Junction Case'7 the ICC authorized the New
York Central Railroad to gain control of terminal railroads under
a 1920 amendment to the Act providing for joint use of terminals
and requiring ICC approval of any acquisition of a terminal.' 8 Com-
petitor railroads who used the terminal railroads and from whom,
as a result of the consolidation, a large volume of freight had been
diverted, sought to set aside the order. There was legal injury be-
cause the loss was attributable to a denial of equal treatment re-
14. The statute provided that "suits to enjoin, set aside, or annul, or suspend any
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be brought in the district court."
Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584, 592 (1906), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1970). Subsequently
a provision authorized any party to an ICC proceeding to intervene as of right in
"any suit wherein is involved the validity of such order . . . and the interest of
such party." Commerce Court Act, 36 Stat. 539, 543 (1910), as amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2323 (1970). This provision did not govern the standing of a party in the ad-
ministrative proceedings to maintain a suit in his own right. The claim that such
participation automatically conferred a right to appeal from the order was rejected
in Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930).
15. 263 U.S. 143 (1923).
16. Id. at 148.
17. 264 U.S. 258 (1924). The Transportation Act of 1920 governing railroad ex-
tensions, acquisitions, and abandonments contained a standing provision authorizing re-
view at the request of "any party in interest." 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970). The Court
did not appear to attach special importance to it in Chicago Junction. It was given
narrow application in L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R.R., 311 U.S. 295 (1940).
18. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 477, as amended 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(18) (1970).
430
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sulting from the acquisition. The Court stressed a statutory mandate
requiring the ICC' 9 to consider the effect of such an acquisition
on other carriers. These carriers therefore had standing to complain
of a disregard of this interest or its inadequate consideration.
Statutory standing was denied to a dockside compressor of cotton
who had been favored by a differential rate on cotton for shipments
to in-town and dockside warehouses in Alexander Sprunt v. United
Slates.2  The ICC had found the rate discriminatory as to the in-
town warehouses and required the railroads to equalize by increasing
the rate for dockside shipments. Again the fact that the carriers had
not pursued the appeal was significant; the complainant had no
standing since he was entitled to reasonable rates, without unjust
discrimination, but not to competitive advantage.21
The only valid ground for criticism of these decisions is disagree-
ment with the Court's interpretation of the Transportation Act2 2 or
with its acceptance of the Act as the only pertinent body of law.
The determination of what served the Act's purposes controlled the
availability of judicial remedies and was obviously a ruling of sub-
stance on an aspect of a claim. These rulings may be thought pre-
liminary, because while disposing of the case, they leave unanswered
whether the administrative action under challenge was warranted
in law. But any dispositive issue is preliminary in this sense, since
its resolution against a plaintiff will render decision of other issues
superfluous.
The matter of legal interest standing does, however, have a cer-
tain priority under standard rules of procedure. Whether an interest
is protected by statute usually puts in issue a question of law, the
kind of question that in private lawsuits might be resolved by a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.23 The issue of validity,
on the other hand, entails an examination of the justifications for
official action and generally requires probing into a greater range
of factors in the case. It would normally not be decided on a motion
to dismiss. Hence procedural techniques whose object is the efficient
disposition of issues in lawsuits would assign priority in the order
of resolution to the question of standing over that of administrative
validity.24
19. 264 U.S. 258, 267 (1924).
20. 281 U.S. 249 (1930).
21. Id. at 257.
22. One commentator characterized the decisions as cautious and restrictive. Scott,
supra note 1, at 655.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(c) and 56.
24. 2A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrnCE §§ 12.08, 12.09 (2d ed. 1972).
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This does not alter the substantive character of the standing
question nor support the view that the purpose of the standing
test is to restrict judicial interventions into the administrative sphere. -25
This conclusion confuses a by-product of substantive rules and pro-
cedural techniques with their underpinnings. The ordinary modes
of procedure in a lawsuit between private parties would warrant the
same course of proceedings, and the standards that dictate a result
of nonintervention or intervention do not focus on propriety as a
separate variable. For example, the clarity of the law controlling the
validity of agency action or the impact of relief are not material to
the standing determination. Thus, the restraint standing imposes
does not seem particularly related to the governmental character of
the defendant.
B. Legal Interest in Nonstatutory Review Cases
1. Private Law Rules as Applied to Public Cases
In the area of nonstatutory review there was no special body of
public law from which courts could formulate actions against the
government except for a few common law writs that were largely
unavailable in federal courts.2 6 The Constitution itself was not a
source of claims. It provided only rules governing defenses.2 7 Al-
though courts might have elaborated upon general legal principles
and policies, they did not formulate special claims for relief in non-
25. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968), with Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113, 129 (1940), and Scott, supra note 1, at 683-90.
26. Two early cases established that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not give federal
courts jurisdiction in mandamus, M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813),
but that the courts of the District of Columbia could issue mandamus as inheritors
of the common law jurisdiction of Maryland, Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524 (1838). There were doubts about the compatibility of mandamus with the
separation of powers and the power was narrowly exercised, Decatur v. Pauling, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). Later the Court ruled that federal courts were without au-
thority to issue the important writ of certiorari, Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162
(1913). In time equitable remedies were expanded to substitute for these common
law remedies. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Simmons v. Farley,
18 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1937), rev'd, 99 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
651 (1938). See also Note, Mandatory Injunctions as Substitutes for Writs of Mandamus
in the Federal District Courts: A Study In Procedural Manipulation, 38 CoLUm. L.
REv. 903 (1938).
27. See, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1900); Pennoyer v. Mc-
Connaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 9-18 (1891); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 500-02 (1887). In some
special instances, however, the Constitution was viewed as the source of claims. See,
e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (reapportionment); Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (desegregation). Cases in which government officials have been
enjoined from enforcing unconstitutional regulatory statutes have been viewed as being
founded entirely on a constitutional claim. See Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 COLU. L. REV. 489, 524 (1954); Hill, Constitutional Remedies,
69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109 (1969).
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statutory actions, perhaps because, as Hart and Sacks suggest, the
common law writ system channeled judicial reasoning into established
forms of action and a consequent search for analogy; 28 or perhaps
because the common law system applicable to nongovernmental law-
suits was thought sufficiently comprehensive as to render separate
rules superfluous. 9 Whatever the explanation, in cases of nonstatutory
review, federal courts drew almost exclusively upon the common
law of private actions to resolve disputes with government officials.30
Private law protections were not merely an indicia of legitimacy
for the invaded interest.31 Rather, the plaintiff had to show that the
established private rules of actionability afforded protection to the
interest in the very circumstances under inspection, save for the of-
ficial identity of the defendant. 32 Thus, the plaintiff had to set forth
a common law cause of action subject to defeat only by way of ac-
cepted defenses. One of these, however-that the defendant was acting
pursuant to law-brought the defendant's official character back into
the case. The plaintiff might then introduce the issue of official le-
gality by alleging that the conduct was beyond valid constitutional or
statutory authority.33
28. H. HART 9- A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
AIPLICATION OF LAW 500 (tent. ed. 1958). They note the inhibiting effect of both
a system of distinct forms of actions and a separation of law and equity on the reasoned
development of rights of action or claims generally.
English courts had never been accustomed to face the question of right of
action or no right of action squarely and systematically. In denying relief they were
used simply to saying This form of action does not lie" or "There is no remedy
for you in this court." With the advent of a single form of action, their tradition
gave them no body of systematic thought for dealing with the fundamental ques-
tion of remedy vel non. American courts inherited this vacuum of basic juris-
prudential thinking.
Id. at 500 (emphasis in original).
29. Thus, changes in the common law should not be lightly countenanced and
statutes in derogation should be strictly construed. Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
365 (1797). See also Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213, 217-18 (1934); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 400
(1908).
30. ,Mr. Justice Jackson has well described this phenomenon:
The painfully logical French reconized from the beginning that controversies
between the citizen and an official, in the performance of his duty as he saw it,
involved some different elements and considerations than the contest between two
private citizens over private matters. . . . But the United States and England
have backed into the whole problem rather than face it.
R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 46-47 (1955).
31. Scott, supra note I, at 650.
32. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Tennessee Elec-
tiic Power Co. %. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605, 620-23 (1912); Elliott v. Swartout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 153-56 (1836); cf.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); C.B.S. v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 91 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir.
1937), aff'd, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
33. Hill, supra note 27, at 1128-31. Common law pleading practices reinforced this
)rivate law perspective on claims against officers. The plaintiff made his declarationin trespass, detinue, debt, or the like, in which he alleged only his own personal or
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This doctrine of official accountability under the private law has
a long and respected lineage in Anglo-American law. Once regarded
as a fundamental aspect of the rule of law, it was the method the
English adopted, and later the Americans, to accommodate the stric-
tures of sovereign immunity with the control of exercises of official
power.34 It worked well enough in the nineteenth century when liti-
gation often involved resisting official impositions on one's person
or property, in the form of custom or tax exactions, which unless
authorized were plainly tortious.35 It worked less well in maintaining
official accountability where claims to bonuses, pensions, and public
lands were involved.36 And it worked very badly in accommodating
nonstatutory review under the proliferation of spending and regula-
tory programs in the twentieth century. 37 But it had a profound in-
fluence on the way interests injured by agency action were regarded
such that only interests within the common law rules were recognized
as private and therefore worthy of protection.S
Thus, a theory of relief in which private duties and privileges de-
termined the scope of those of the government was adopted as the
test of standing in a cluster of Supreme Court decisions in the 1930's,
and was used in innumerable cases in the lower courts extending over
property interest and the defendant's wrongful invasion or seizure. That the defendant
was purportedly carrying on govermnent business was defensive matter and hence in-
troduced in the answering plea. The statutory or constitutional attack on the latter
was first raised in the plaintiff's response to the plea, the replication. These pleading
conventions structured the lawsuit in such a way as to confirm the theory that the
plaintiff was pressing a private law claim, relying on a public law matter only to
overcome a plea of justification. Thus, the statute or authority under which the
defendant was acting, which both granted and limited his authority, was not per-
ceived as the source of the claim of right against the officer or protection for the
plaintiff; cf. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). See also Chaffin v. Taylor,
114 U.S. 309 (188-1) (trespass); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 271, 282-83 (1881)
(detinue); B. SIPuMAN, HANDBOOK OF CO.M MON LAW PLXDING 207-13, 298-301, 360-81
(3d ed. HAV. Ballantine 1923).
The pleading practice in equity was different in that the plaintiff had to allege
the whole story, including the anticipation of defenses and responses thereto. But
this did not necessarily change the way the suit was regarded, since defenses and
responses can be viewed in much the same way as they were at law. Ex parte Young.
209 U.S. 123, 129-31 (1908); C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EquiTY PLrEDING ch. I
(2d ed. 1883).
34. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Pennoyer
v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1891); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 500-02 (1887).
See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 213-31.
35. See, e.g., Meritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694 (1881); Collector v. Doswell & Co., 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 156 (1872); Bend v. Hout, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839); Elliott v.
Swartout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 153-61 (1836).
36. Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911); Games v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
316 (1868); Dorsheimer v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 166 (1868); Decatur v.
Pauling, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); cf. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538, 546 (1895) (no review of the power to deport or exclude aliens).
37. See pp. 445-47 infra.
38. See pp. 476-78 infra.
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three decades. 39 The first Supreme Court decision was Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes,4° a suit by a private power company to enjoin
federal loans and grants to municipalities in Alabama for the con-
struction of competitive light and power plants on the gTound that
they were either unauthorized by statute or beyond the power of
the federal government. A unanimous Court held the plaintiff to
be without standing by virtue of the rule that where competition
is itself lawful, a company cannot challenge loans or grants to a
competitor by alleging that they were made without lawful au-
thority.41
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A. 42 is similar in structure
and result, except that a bevy of power companies also sought to
enjoin direct sales by the TVA to industrial users. Again the Court
analogized the controversy to one between two private parties, hold-
ing that one cannot charge a competitor with a defect in its grant
of powers or with acquiring resources in violation of law. It con-
cluded that damage caused by competition, which was otherwise
lawful, would "not support a cause of action or a right to sue." 43
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. involved a challenge by bidders for
government contracts to a minimum wage order under the Public
Contracts Act.44 The Act authorized the Secretary of Labor to es-
tablish minimums pursuant to a statutory formula, which the com-
panies charged had been disregarded. There was no standing, since
Congress had imposed rules governing purchasing and the Secretary
had acted as a purchasing agent implementing instructions from her
39. See, e.g., South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970); Rural Elec. Admin. v. Central Louisiana
Elec. Co,, 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1967); Braude v.
Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965); Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d
872 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1964); Harrison-Halsted Community
Group v. Housing & Home Financing Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962); Pittsburgh
Hotels Ass'n v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 309 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1962); Kansas City
Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884
(1955); South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 285 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.
I11, 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969). See also 3 DAMs TREATISE, supra note
1, § 22.11, 22.16; Note, Protecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek
Review of Community Relocation Planning, 73 YALE LJ. 1080 (1964).
40. 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
41. As the Court stated:
If such a suit can be maintained, similar suits by innumerable persons are like-
wise admissible to determine whether money is being loaned with lawful authority
for uses which, although hurtful to the complainants, are perfectly lawful.
Id. at 480-81. The Court also affirmed the lower court findings that there was neither
unlawful solicitation nor coercion by the federal officials nor a common law con-
spiracy to injure petitioner's business. Id. at 478.
42. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
43. Id. at 139-40.
44. 310 U.S. 113 (1940). See 49 Stat. 2036, as amended 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
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principal, to whom she was solely responsible. She, like a private
agent, was immune from suit.4 5
The common law rule of standing in these cases operated on the
merits of claims in the same manner as the statutory rule. It too
represented an adjudication of an official legal duty or obligation to
the complainant and hence a determination of whether one had a
claim for relief. As in the statutory cases, the effect of finding no
claim under the private law is to moot the remaining issue in the
case, that of the defendant's official justification for the action.
Similarly, the private law issue may often, but not always, be de-
cided before trial by reference to the pleadings and established
common law rules.4 6 The common law issue, unlike the statutory
one, however, necessarily retains priority in resolution since it is the
claim for relief and lawful authorization is a defense to it. 4 7
It has been argued, however, that denials of standing in these
common law cases represent an exercise of discretion to avoid de-
cision on the merits, Illustrating that standing, along with ripeness
or political question doctrine, governs the proper conditions for reach-
ing acceptable decisions and the occasions of conflict with other
branches of government. 48 Standing in Tennessee Electric or Perkins
45. 310 U.S. at 129. See also City of Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939).
46. Common law proceedings on standing can be substantially more complex and
protracted than they might appear in appellate opinions. In Alabama Power Co. v.
Ickes, the district court held, after a full evidentiary hearing, that plaintiffs had
standing to maintain their suit but denied the injunction on the merits. See note 41
supra. Its findings are listed in the Supreme Court's opinion, 302 U.S. at 475-77. In
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., a three-judge court was convened under 50
Stat. 751, 752 § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 380a (1937), to hear the complaint filed by 19 power
companies. The hearing consumed seven weeks and 1,100 exhibits were offered. The
district court concluded that there was no fraud, malice, coercion, or conspiracy. 21
F. Supp. 947, 961 (E.D. Tenn. 1938). See also Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Rural
Elec. Admin., 236 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. La. 1964), rev'd, 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 115 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1953), rev'd, 225
F.2d 924, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
47. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963); Taylor v. Anderson, 234
U.S. 74: 75-76 (1914); Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 340 (1906). See generally Hill,
supra note 27, at 1128-31.
48. Ripeness and political question illustrate the access-merit distinction. Ripene"'
deals with preenforcement challenges to statutes by examining the fitness of the issue
for resolution and hardship from delay. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967). The posture of the unripe case prevents access to material and concrete
data about a statute's applications, enforcement policy, and the nature of the activities
subject to it. Compare Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 157 (1967), and Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947), with Railroad Transfer Service, Inc. v.
Chicago, 386 U.S. 351 (1967). The issues often entail a weighing of competing values
in light of empirical data. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
with United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Insufficient information
with which to formulate standards is important in political question cases also, where
the subject matter, such as foreign affairs, may preclude judicial access to the relevant
facts. See, e.g., Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Ludeckey v. Watkins, 335
U.S. 160 (1948); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); Scharpf, supra
note 3, at 555-58, 566-73.
As acknowledgments of the institutional limitations of the judicial process and its
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is therefore closely associated with the Article III ingredient4 9 in-
suring "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is-
sues." 511 These cases, Professor Bickel argues, involve "impure stand-
ing. . in which adjudication of the merits was declined despite
the presence of an adversary case. . . . Pure standing ensures a mini-
mum of concreteness; the other, impure elements of standing and
the concept of ripeness seek further concreteness in varying condi-
tions that cannot be described by a fixed constitutional generali-
zation." Professor Scharpf adds that impure standing is a tech-
nique by which the Court selects cases to ensure itself of an adequate
record and sufficient exploration of the merits.52
The premise of this argument, that Article III or pure standing
assures the adequate presentation of issues, is doubtful; the require-
ment of a party with an interest at stake allows for minimal con-
creteness but not informed presentation.
An examination of Tennessee Electric and Perkins reveals that
there were no conceivable institutional or process factors reflecting
discretionary refusals to decide cases. The plaintiffs represented large
segments of the affected industry53 and were intensely interested in
the subject matter of the litigation; injury from the challenged action
was neither contingent nor speculative. The issue in Tennessee Elec-
tric did not present reviewability problems. On the constitutional
level it concerned the disposition of electric power as an incident to
the federal government's powers over navigation, war, or commerce.
dependency on knowledge that is not always available, these doctrines are designed
to defer rather than resolve the merits of a claim. The claim provides a basis for
characterizing an issue, but it remains undecided. Hence, greater access to necessary
information at a later date would permit resolution of either a political question or
iipeness case. Though usually a more permanent form of abstention, the political ques-
tion ruling is a refusal to apply legal principles because competency exists elsewhere.
It is, quite literally, a determination of no jurisdiction to decide. Unlike standing, neither
disposes of a claim, though some argue that prejudgment has its own objectionable
consequence. See Vining, supra note 3, at 1522-23.
49. In Perkins the Court asserted that the decision "rest[s] . . . upon reasons deeply
tooted in the constitutional divisions of authority in our system of government and
the impropriety of judicial interpretations of law at the instance of those who show
no more than a mere possible .injury to the public." 310 U.S. 113, 132 (1940). At
several points the Court characterized the interest of complainants as the "public's
interest in the administration of law." Id. at 125, 127, 129. There are similar statements
and reasoning in the power cases. See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S.
118 (19.9): Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1961).
51. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 122-24.
52. Scharpf, supra note 3, at 529. See also Lewis, supra note 6, at 447-81.
53. In Tennessee Electric the complainants were 19 public utilities operating under
charters from Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. 306 U.S. at 134-35. Data concerning the size
and output of the complainants in Perkins may be found in the Complaint for In-
junction and Declaratory Judgment, Civil Action File No. 1839, U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, at 2-6 (filed Feb. 25, 1939).
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Whether a government function is necessary and proper to the exer-
cise of enumerated powers is not an easy question, but it is a ques-
tion with which the Court had gTappled for over a century.54 Indeed
a similar issue had been adjudicated shortly before in Ashwander v.
T.V.A., in which the private law was seen to be satisfied 55 although
the litigating circumstances were more questionable.
The determination in Perkins involved a construction of an act
of Congress for which there were ample indicia of legislative intent., '
The task can hardly be said to be a nonjudicial one. If these were
cases of discretionary denials of adjudication, and there is not a clue
to support that in the decisions, the bases for the exercise of that
discretion are mysterious.
2. Private Law Rules as Applied to Private Cases
Private litigation in denying relief despite injury and unlawful
conduct57 entails the use of rules that deal with the same elements
of a claim as common law standing. Such rules are among the laws
governing claims and, because they are not subsumed under the
rubric of standing, clearly express the kind of substantive reasons
for which relief is denied: that the defendant owes no "duty" to the
54. See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Luxton v. North River
Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
55. In Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936), the Court upheld the standing
of preferred shareholders of the Alabama Power Company to sue to enjoin the per-
formance of a contract between the company and the TVA. The agreement was
for the purchase by the TVA from the company of certain transmission lines and
property, an interchange of power, and mutual limitations on the sale of power. The
primary claim was that the contract was void because the proposed activity of the
TVA was beyond the power of the federal government and that the contract in-
trinsically or because of its illegality would harm the company's interests.
The Court, over dissents, upheld the right of shareholders to seek to restrain the
execution of the contract:
To entitle the complaints to equitable relief, in the absence of an adequate
legal remedy, it is enough for them to show the breach of trust, or duty involved
in the injurious and illegal action.
Id. at 319. See also Frankfurter & Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the
October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 H.ARv. L. REV. 577, 623 (1938).
56. There was a considerable amount of legislative history behind this provision.
310 U.S. at 128. The plaintiffs were challenging a construction of the Public Con-
tracts Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (Supp. IV 1936). For a general compilation of congres-
sional discussion concerning this bill, see Brief for Petitioner and App. to Brief for
Petitioner 20-64.
57. The notion of proximate cause in tort law offers a rich variety of cases il-
lustrating such rules. See, e.g., Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 205
F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1953); Palsgraff v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928); Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A.2d 289 (1951). Similarly, interference
with contract is not recoverable if the interference is either unintentional or too
remote. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock &- Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Northern
States Contracting Co. v. Oakes, 191 Minn. 88, 253 N.W. 371 (1934); Stevenson v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (C.A. Ohio 1946).
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plaintiff, that the defendant's conduct is not the "legal" cause of
plaintiff's injuries, or that the plaintiff's interest is not one which
the law protects. However expressed, the determination is not a mat-
ter apart from the merits of a claim; the purposes or goals of the
particular area of law involved are best effectuated by denying relief.
Among the cases in which private law rules operate to deny what
is termed standing in judicial review proceedings, there is the com-
mon class of tort suits in which a plaintiff alleges that the breach
of a statutory norm has caused him injury. If the plaintiff is not
within the "ambit of risk," either because he is not within the pro-
tected class or his harm is not one the statute was designed to pre-
vent, recovery is usually denied.58 If breach of the statute-concededly
illegal conduct-is viewed separately from the right to recover it
may be said that the plaintiff is without standing. But relief is denied
because of the line in tort law between compensating accident vic-
tims and limiting liability to fault and foreseeable harms; the result
is attributable to common law fault principles as these interact with
legislation.59 The determination is no less substantive, on the merits,
than if we had found the plaintiff within the ambit of risk and then
found no violation of the statute. There too principles of fault lia-
bility prevent recovery.
Similarly the substantive policies underlying fault liability may be
seen in a difficult common law tort case, Ultra Mares v. Touche,60
in which a creditor who had lent money to an insolvent corporation
in reliance on negligently prepared financial statements was unable
to recover against accountants responsible for the statement. Although
there was unlawful conduct and foreseeable harm, the ramifications
of liability were too great.0' A claimant in these circumstances might
be said to be without standing to sue, but he is for reasons that are
among the basic policies of tort law.
58. See, e.g., Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (Ex. Chain. 1874); Richards v. Stanley,
43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. v. Keirse, 266 P.2d
617 (Okla. 1954); cf. Erickson v. Kongsli, 40 Wash. 2d 79, 240 P.2d 1209 (1952).
59. In Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943), Justice Traynor
observed:
When a legislative body has generalized a standard from the experience of the
community and prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm, the court accepts
the formulated standards and applies them except where they would serve to im-
pose liability without fault.
Id. at 75, 136 P.2d at 778. See also Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987
(1939); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLM. L.
REV. 21 (1949); Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence
Actions, 28 TExAS L. REV. 143 (1949).
60. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
61. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
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The law of contract also provides examples where breach and in-
jury do not suffice for recovery. Unintended or incidental bene-
ficiaries of an agreement may not recover for willful nonperformance,
notwithstanding reasonable reliance or expectations on their part.'2
A party to an agreement suffering special losses may not recover for
them unless he brought them to the attention of the promisor at the
time of making the contract. 3 These also are substantive rules of
decision related to the goals of contract law.
A recent colloquy illustrates the vagaries engendered in seeking to
relate the rules of claims in these private cases to a threshold or non-
merit concept of standing. Professor Davis has long advocated that
the only proper requirement of standing is injury in fact from gov-
ernment action, which he bases on an "elemental principle of jus-
tice" expressed for centuries in the common law governing private
relationships: if A hurts B, B has standing to get a determination
of the legality of A's action. Therefore where "the government has
hurt B[,] [a]part from all statutes and all cQnstitutional provisions,
B has a common-law action for damages and a right to sue in equity
for an injunction."0 1 He adds that: "[I]f judges' power to create new
rights must be continued, their smaller power to do something less
than that-recognize that some new interests suffice for standing-
must likewise be continued."' 5 But harm and illegality without proof
of standing-duty or legal cause-do not allow B to recover at con-
mon law. Therefore there is no principle entitling B to an adjudica-
tion of legality and the recognition of new interests for standing is
the creation of a right, not the exercise of a lesser power.
62. See Diggs v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 57 Cal. App. 57, 206 P. 765 (1922);
Ball v. Cecil, 285 Ky. 438, 148 S.W.2d 273 (1941); Witzman v. Sjoberg, 16- Minn. 411,
205 N.W. 257 (1925); Silverman v. Food Fair Stores, 407 Pa. 507, 180 A.2d 894 (1962).
See generally 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 779C, G (1951); 2 WILLIsTON ON CONTPACTs§§ 402-03 (3d ed. 1959); RESIATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 147 (1932).
63. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854); Globe Refining Co. v. Landa
Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
64. DAVIS TEXT, supra note 1, § 22.07, at 432-33. This principle, he notes, is the
same "whether B's interest is in land, business, religion, health, aesthetics, recreation,
or any other interest of which the law takes cognizance." Id. See also Davis, supra
note 1, at 468, where he adds:
The only problems about standing should be what interests deserve protection
against injury, and what should be enough to constitute an injury. Whether in-
terests deserve legal protection depends upon whether they are sufficiently sig-
nificant and whether good policy calls for protecting them or for denying them
protection. The common law usually provides remedies for slight injuries to small
interests ....
The assumption is that the determination of what interests deserve protection is to
be made without regard to the particular context in which they are asserted. Interest
in this usage seemingly refers to the injury being inflicted on the plaintiff, which
leads him to complain, but not to the legal limitations on which he relies. The
latter appears to be generally irrelevant to standing. But see note 313 infra.
65. 3 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note I, § 22.00-3, at 711 (Supp. 1970).
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In responding to Professor Davis' characterization of the natural
common law method in private law suits-injury plus alleged il-
legality equals a common law claim entitling one to an adjudication
-Professor Jaffe argues that "that is not the common law. Rather,
it is well established that if A alleges that B is violating a statute
and the court concludes that the statute was not designed to protect
A's interest the court will not determine the validity of A's claim."' 0
Although his conclusion is correct, Professor Jaffe's threshold char-
acterization of the common law basis for legal interest is inaccurate.0 7
Its essential premise is that decision in statutory tort cases is not on
the merits and that they do not involve "judicial intervention and
judgment." He observes that such cases can be dismissed on the
pleadings. But adjudication on the pleadings, without trial, is the
normal way of deciding the case on the merits where the pleadings
raise only a question of law. 68
Professor Jaffe's description confuses an effect of applying substan-
tive rules with the purposes behind them. To characterize the outcome
of the competitor and statutory tort cases by saying that the plaintiff
"may not sue" or that "the court will not determine the validity of
A's claim" is misleading. A court has adjudicated the claim and has
said that the plaintiff may not recover. These rules are not designed to
determine when a plaintiff may sue or when a court may intervene,69
any more than rules imposing liability seek to determine when a
defendant may defend. One might say that where the rules of sub-
stantive law provide recovery, the defendant may not assert his de-
fenses or the court will not determine their validity. But this would
be a curious if not inaccurate way of describing the operation of
substantive rules of law.
In sum, one cannot transform substantive rules of law, elements
of a cause of action, into procedural or preliminary principles of
66. Jaffe, Standing Again, supra note 1, at 636 (emphasis in original).
67. Professor Davis now seems to agree with this explanation. He recently stated
that "[i]n the case of statutes, Professor Jaffe's old authorities were once the law,
but they have not necessarily survived the liberalization of the law of standing."
Dtvis TEXT, supra note I, § 22.07, at 432 nA.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.09 (2d ed. 1972).
69. Cases in which a plaintiff outside the ambit of risk may recover reveal that
these rules are concerned with substantive tort policy and not judicial intrusive-
ne~s or natural principles of justice. See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,
355 US. 426 (1958); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917); Osborne v.
Van Dyke, 113 Iowa 557, 85 N.W. 784 (1901); Koonovsky v. Quellette, 226 Mass. 474,
116 N.E. 243 (1917). These are instances where the fault principle is relaxed in favor
of other policies, such as risk spreading or apportioning blame. For substantive rules
governing competitor claims see 3 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs §§ 708-10 (1938).
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access to a court. The natural common law method simply reveals
that rules of standing are an integral part of a claim for relief.
C. Costs of the Threshold View of Standing
The plaintiffs without standing in the cases described in the pre-
vious two sections were not denied a day in court. They had their
day and lost for the most traditional of reasons: they had no claim.
But the resolution of elements of a claim under a threshold rubric
had a number of significant consequences. Because courts did not
realize that they were directly confronting and deciding a cause of
action, standing decisions failed to articulate and apply principles
and policies. Treating the question as a threshold one limited the
source of rules to statutory policy or the private law, depending upon
whether a statute authorized review. Where review was not statutory,
a court could enlarge standing only by fashioning a principle of pri-
vate rather than public law.70 The refusal to act upon statutory
policy in such cases was not examined. A disposition to generalize
about the adequacy of interests apart from the circumstances in which
they were asserted 7' led to the development of over-broad rules, such
as "the law favors competition. 7 2 Related to this was a tendency to
decide standing in a summary or cursory manner, befitting a pre-
70. See pp. 435-36 supra. The Court stressed the inconvenience in the private
sector that would result from upholding standing in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
71. In City of Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939) (per curiam), the Court relied
on the competition rule in holding that a city consumer of coal had no standing to
challenge an order increasing the mininmum price for coal. It also invoked other cases
whose relevance to the standing issue was obscure. Although Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), dealt with the standing of a prospective bidder to challenge
a wage provision in one procurement statute, it became the authority for the vastly
broader assertion that bidders on particular government contracts have no standing
to make any challenge to the conduct of the bidding or the award. See p. 461
infra. See, e.g., United States v. Grayline Water Tours, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962);
Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Walter P. Villere Co. v. Blinn, 156 F.2d
914 (5th Cir. 1946). Perhaps the rule of substantive law relied on in Perkins-that
third parties may not hold an agent accountable for failure to follow instructions-
is broad enough to cover some of these suits. But the question was never asked. In-
stead courts relied on the somewhat meaningless proposition that bidders had no legal
interest in the administration of govern.ment purchasing, which is not a rule of private
law. Courts also did not take note of the fact that Perkins was reversed by legislation,
see Fulbright Amendment, § 301 of Defense Production Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 308
(1952) (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1970)).
72. See, e.g., Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 923 (1970) (statutory purpose to protect must be explicit, "there ordinarily being
no right to be free from competition," 417 F.2d at 176); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 406
F.2d 1147, 1149 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded per curiam, 397 U.S. 315,
aff'd, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 400 U.S. 45 (1970).
See also Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 884 (1955), and cases cited note 71 supra. But cf. Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1958).
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liminary inquiry.73 Further, in light of the vagueness of standing
and its purposes, there was the danger that its consideration would
be blended with judicial doubts about the asserted claim of invalidity
or skepticism over the propriety of judicial intervention, thus result-
ing in ill-focused and poorly considered decisions.7 4
The most severe costs of the threshold view of standing stemmed
from reliance on inadequate private law rules of decision. The pri-
vate law rules may appear to provide a checklist which qualifies per-
sons with interests worthy of protection for judicial review, 75 but be-
cause their use entails adjudication of a claim against an official as
if he were a private individual, an intelligible accommodation of the
relevant interests in a case has not been reached. By substituting
inappropriate principles underlying private rules, courts have failed
to determine statutory and constitutional purposes and thus inade-
quately resolved claims founded on them. The necessity of initially
deciding the private law standing claim distracts attention from the
main claim in the case and delays its resolution. In addition, the
emphasis upon private common law rights and duties inherent in
the practice impedes recognition of statutory claims based upon nar-
rower interests in administrative programs.
At the most general level, rules of private law not only order re-
lationships between private individuals and groups, but also reflect
a considered adjustment of their conflicting and competing inter-
ests. Behind these accommodations are assumptions and assessments
of the purposes, aspirations, motives, and interests that are associated
73. Compare the circuit courts' opinions in Association of Data Processing Service
Orgs. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1969), finding no statutory intent to
protect against competitive harm, and Barlow v. Collins, 398 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir.
1969), finding no intent to protect tenant farmers, with the Supreme Court's exami-
nations of the statutes and rulings on intent to protect, 397 U.S. 150, and 397 U.S.
159 (1970). See also Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing & Home Finance
Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962).
74. See Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 915 (1963); Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing & Home Finance
Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962); Berry v. House & Home Finance Agency, 233
F. Supp. 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-70, 176-78
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, Supra note 1,
at 503; Scott, supra note 1, at 683-90.
75. See JAFFE, JUDICIML CONTROL, supra note 1, at 511-13; P. BATOR, P. MISmIN,
D. SHtAPIRO & H. WVECISLER, HART AND WVECIISLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 151-54 (2d ed. 1973). But see Jackson, supra note 30, at 46-47. Recent
judicial reliance on private rules appears to occur in cases where they serve to confer
standing. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Bantam Books Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 5R (1963).
It has been appreciated in other contexts that private analogy and private law rules
are not generally a helpful basis for defining government duties and obligations. See,
e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Thorpe v. Housing Auth.,
393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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with individual and institutional private conduct. Utilizing these
rules to resolve claims against government officials cannot reflect the
same social ordering because a federal agency, unlike an ordinary
private company, wields the power of government whether it acts
lawfully or not.70 Ordinarily the interests and purposes behind gov-
ernment activities and the harms they produce do not correspond with
those of private persons.7 7 Thus, government and its officials are
subject to special restraints and they enjoy privileges and immunities
from liability for harmful conduct that private persons do not.7a
Similarly common law limitations on liability or remedy do not neces-
sarily apply when the defendant is a government official.
In actions between officials and private persons the rules gov-
erning the claim and defining the contours of the protected interest
must differ from private ones if the relevant interests are to be co-
herently accommodated. For example, a private citizen does not com-
mit a trespass if he demands and is granted admission to one's home,
since the homeowner may lock the door or call the policed0 This
immunity, however, cannot be extended to consent extracted by a
police officer in this manner. In addition the measure of damages
in a private trespass action is based upon actual monetary injury to
property,80 but unlawful search of one's home by an official, although
a trespass, requires considerably different treatment for appropriate
redress. The invasion of privacy and security usually involves hu-
miliation and suffering rather than damage to property.
76. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 107-11 (1945); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1914).
77. See pp. 445-49 infra. Where the purposes behind private activity are impor-
tant and can be expressed with sufficient generality, the activity is deemed priv-
ileged and the interests it injures are unprotected (e.g., one's right to compete with
others); where the activity and its purposes must be treated with greater particu-
larity, the matter becomes one of defense and the interest invaded is protected (e.g.,
privileged interference with contract relations). These allocations are normally of no
great importance. But in determining common law standing, the most general ex-
pressions of private purposes are the ones that are operative to deny protection against
harms worked by the government.
78. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th
Cir. 1968); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981
(1965); Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961); Pregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
79. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRrs § 1.11 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF ToRTs § 18, at 101-02 (4th ed. 1971).
80. Wyant v. Crouse, 127 Mich. 158, 86 N.W. 527 (1901); Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C.
287, 10 S.E.2d 804 (1940). Where there is no pecuniary loss, nominal damages may
be awarded to vindicate the possessory interest in land. Giddups v. Rogalewski, 192
Mich. 319 (1916); Dougherty v. Steep, 18 N.C. 371 (1835). See generally W. PROSER,
supra note 79, § 13, at 66-67. Occasionally punitive damages may be awarded, but
these must bear a relationship to the actual damage to land. See Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 41-44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Taylor v. Fine, 115 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.
Cal. 1953). See generally IICCORMICK ON DAMAGES § 78 (1935); Foote, Tort Remedies
For Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 497-99, 513 (1955);
Morris, Punitive Damages in Torts Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1931).
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The recognition that private rules should not govern these rela-
tionships between an individual and the government 8l is broadly ap-
plicable to the more complicated government activities characteristic
of administrative action. For example, the private law rule used in
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. provided inapposite reasons for denying
relief and distorted the purpose of the relevant statute, the Walsh-
Healey Act. " This rule immunizes an agent from liability to third
parties for breach of his principal's instruction, even where the breach
is willful and the instructions confer a benefit upon the complaining
third parties. Because the principal may adequately supervise his
agent's activities and at any time revoke the agency or alter the
instructions, the arrangement is too fluid to allow actions against
the agent.83
This rationale cannot justify denying a claim against a public of-
ficial; statutory requirements, like those of the Walsh-Healey Act,
are not too unstable a base for adjudication. Moreover, it is question-
begging to conclude from private agency relationships that Congress
is the body to supervise administrative wage determinations under
the Act. It is no more appropriate a forum for review here than
elsewhere; viewing the Secretary as purchasing agent does not alter
institutional competencies. Most important, the assumption from
agency law that the statute was intended to benefit the government
or the public illustrates a tendency to construe statutes and programs
in ways that distort statutory purpose by substituting the understand-
ings of private relationships for ordinary statutory construction. The
result is to ignore legislative purposes to protect or bestow benefits on
favored groups because the common law would not manifest such a
purpose in the analogous private circumstance.
Secretary Perkins was obliged to establish minimum wages by as-
81. The Court recently recognized and acted on this principle in creating a federal
cause of action independent of the incidents of the private tort against federal of-
ficers for unlawful arrest. It explained:
Respondents seek to treat the relationship between a citizen and a federal agent
unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no different from the relationship be-
tween two private citizens. In so doing, they ignore the fact that power, once
granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used. An agent
acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far
greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority
other than his own.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
391-92 (1971).
82. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 129 (1940); the Walsh-Healey Act of
1936, 49 Stat. 2036, is codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970). Although the opinion has
several themes, this one greatly influenced the Court's conclusion that the companies
were without standing.
83. CORBIN ON CoNTRACrs § 779E (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 342
(1957).
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sessing those prevailing in the "locality" in which the goods were to
be manufactured or furnished.8 4 The controversy was over the ex-
tent to which "locality" required the Secretary to take account of
regional differences in prevailing wages. Resolution should have
turned on an analysis of statutory purposes. The Court noted the
central ones-to impose obligations upon government contractors and
to prevent national expenditures from "offending fair social standards
of employment."' 5 But it ignored that the further definition of "so-
cial standards of employment" qualified the overall statutory goals
and established a distinct purpose as well. The "locality" formula re-
stricted the Secretary's discretion and, while proscribing a limited
form of wage competition as a factor in bidding, it sought to pre-
serve both regional differences in wage payments and the prevailing
rate within a locality. At perhaps the cost of the fairest minimums,
these goals were designed to benefit management prerogative and
control in covered industries. Thus a violation was a disregard of
a rule enacted for the protection of companies seeking to sell to the
government.8 6 But this claim was not addressed in Perkins because
the common law of agency obscured the statutory purpose and thus
distorted resolution of the claim.
This distortion of statutory protections caused by reading into
governmental arrangements the purposes associated with private ones
is endemic to the private law approach. The refusal to derive pro-
tections for private interests from legal restraints is evident in a num-
ber of later cases, particularly challenges to the use of federal funds
under the rural electricity and urban renewal programs. Limitations
84. The Act provided in part:
(b) That all persons employed by the contractor in the manufacture or furnishing
of the materials . . . used in the performance of the contract will be paid, . . not
less than the minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the
prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar work or in the par-
ticular or similar industries or groups of industries currently operating in the
locality in which the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment are to be manu-
fa'ctured or furnished under said contract.
Public Contracts Act of June 30, 1936, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036-37, as amended 41 U.S.C.
§ 35(b) (1970).
85. 310 U.S. at 128. Aside from mention of these overall purposes of the Walsh-
Healey Act; the Court does not examine or mention the purposes of the statutory
provision in issue.
86. See note 56 supra. Subsequent legislation confirms the point. The Fulbright
Amendment, § 301 of Defense Production Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 308 (codified at 41 U.S.C.
. 43a(a) (1970)), provides in part that "any interested person shall have the right of
judicial review of any legal question which might otherwise be raised, including but
not limited to wage determinations and the interpretation of the terms 'locality,'
,regular dealer,' 'manufacturer,' and 'open market.'" The amendment also made clear
that review of a wage determination could be had by "any manufacturer .. .who is
in any industry to which such wage determination is applicable." Senator Fulbright
explained: "It is our purpose by this Amendment to overturn that [Perkins] de-
cision." 98 CONG. RFc. 6531 (1952). See also Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co., 337 F.2d
518 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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in such programs favoring designated groups were interpreted to
serve public purposes, not to confer private benefits. Hence the re-
striction on rural electricity grants to areas without adequate private
utility service was to maximize subsidies for rural areas by conserv-
ing federal funds and not to protect private companies.87
Limitations on governmental authority often are expressive of pur-
poses from which the existence of private interests are inferred and
protected. Because of the elaboration and application on behalf of
private parties of constitutional provisions that distribute and limit
governmental competency, our legal system recognizes and acts upon
purposes behind legal restraints. 88 There are, for example, countless
instances in which a private litigant may invoke the allocation of
state and federal power in the Constitution to challenge legislative
competence by claiming that price or wage regulation is not within
the national commerce power,8s or that social welfare expenditures
are beyond the federal spending power,90 or that a state health or
87. In the rural electric cases, private utilities, challenging federal grants to coopera-
tive power producers, invoked a statute and administrative bulletin restricting subsidies
to areas not receiving reasonable service from private utilities. Act of May 20, 1936, ch.
.132, § 4, 49 Stat. 1365, as amended 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1970); REA Bulletin 111-3. Legis-
lative history also supported the claim. See 80 CoNG. REc. 2751-53, 2823, 5283, 5295,
5307 (1936). See generally Comment, 49 B.U.L. REV. 154 (1969). Courts uniformly dis-
missed, stating that the injury was merely competitive, that the statute was not "regu-
latory," and that the restriction was solely to channel subsidies to areas with the
greatest need. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Cooperative, 394 F.2d 672
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 1000 (1968); Rural Elec. Admin. v. Northern States
Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); Rural Elec.
Admin. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 815 (1967). For examples of the urban redevelopment cases see Berry v. Housing
& Home Finance Agency, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965), in which a hotel attacked the
plan for including a competing hotel, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1456(g) (1964), for-
bidding such construction unless the local supply of transient housing were inadequate.
Finding that the provision was intended to limit expenditures on nonresidential build-
ings, the court ruled that it conferred no protection and observed that "some statutes
create merely public rights, enforceable only by the agency charged with their ad-
ministration," id. at 940. Accord, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1964); Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n v. Urban Rede-
velopment Authority, 309 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1962); cf. Harrison-Halsted Community
Group v. Housing & Home Finance Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962).
88. E.g., Powell v. McCornack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (congressional exclusion of an
elected congressman); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(presidential seizure of steel mills without statutory authorization); Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (presidential removal of Federal Trade Commission
member contrary to statute); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (presidential
removal of postmaster without satisfying statute requiring consent of Senate). See also
Corwin, Constitution v. Constitutional Theory, 19 AN POL. Sc'. REV. 290, 291 (1925);
Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in
Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. I, 38-40 (1968).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
cf. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
90. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Child Labor Tax
Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
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safety measure is in conflict with Congress's authority over com-
merce.91 In comparison, the purposes of the statutory provisions in
Perkins, among others, are far more easily established, with far less
judicial lawmaking, than the matrix of limitations embodied in the
Constitution.
The government enterprise or subsidized competition cases also
substitute private for public purposes in their reliance on the com-
mon law rule which bars recovery for injuries to one's business in-
flicted by competitors through ordinary trade practices. In light of
the free market one's inability to compete is merely a sign of inef-
ficiency.92 But government or subsidized enterprise, financed mainly
out of tax revenues, is not simply an ordinary business. 93 Its ability
to compete effectively cannot be read as an indication of the inef-
ficiency of complaining competitors. The government is not subject
to the discipline of the market in raising capital or in setting prices. 4
An example of the refusal to credit purposes behind legal pro-
visions occurred in Tennessee Electric,a in which the companies'
invocation of constitutional limits on national authority was treated
as a derivative claim of the states under the Tenth Amendment. The
tradition of litigating claims against federal competence, however,
was precisely the opposite: Individuals harmed by an assertion of
91. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511 (1935); The Passenger Cases, 74 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
92. See Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (C.A. 1889);
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 79, § 6.13; 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 708, Com-
ments c & d (1938). The Robinson-Patman Act, antitrust laws, and the tort of inter-
ference with contractual or advantageous relationships demonstrate that the private
freedom to compete is hedged with restrictions. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Charles Broadway Rouss, Inc. v.
Winchester Co., 300 F. 706 (2d Cir. 1924); Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle, 118 Ky. 662,
82 S.W. 271 (1904). See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES §§ 6.5-.13; 4 RrSTAIENT t  OF
TORTS §§ 763-65, 768 (1939).
93. Cases challenging government enterprise or sponsorship also invoke the com-
mon law rule that persons outside a corporation, particularly competitors, may not
challenge corporate action as being beyond the authority of its charter. See, eg.,
Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. 166, 173 (1881). Another line of cases holds that
a company's franchise, exclusive or restrictive, affords a legal property interest suffi-
cient to challenge others competing without a proper franchise. See, e.g., Conway v.
Taylor's Ex'r, 66 U.S. (I Black) 603 (1861); cf. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S.
515 (1929).
94. See generally TVA: TE FIRS-r TwEsTy YEARS (R. Martin ed. 1956).
95. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). Lewis' characterization of a challenge to federal competency
as a Tenth Amendment claim is a curious proposition since the Amendment is only
declaratory. See Lewis, supra note 6. It describes but adds nothing to the distribution
of federal and local power. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). It also
does not sort out state from private claims, since it reserves undelegated powers "to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X. Lewis does not ex-
plain why the power at issue in Tennessee Electric belonged to states rather than the
people.
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federal power, unlike states, 0 may question whether it is within the
constitutional distribution. The premises behind this allocation are
not changed because injury arises from competition.97
The conspiracy, coercion, and malice claims in the competition
cases illustrate another irrelevancy of private law rules and also an-
other cost of using them-the pursuit and sometimes trial of issues
peripheral to the main claim in the case. 90 In Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Committee v. McGrath,99 for example, the plaintiffs' principal
claim was that they had been denied procedural due process by the
Attorney General's summary designation of their organization as
subversive. After a protracted wrangle through the federal courts, the
common law standing issue finally was thought to concern the tort
of group defamation, 00 an issue at most peripherally related to pro-
cedural due process. But a trial on defamation and several appeals
on a matter irrelevant to the merits might have been required be-
fore getting to the dispositive issue.
96. For examples of pri~ate challenges to federal authority see Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (taxing and spending); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483 (1880) (treaty power); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (commerce
power).
Until Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), states apparently had not brought
suits directly challenging federal competency. There the Commonwealth, along with
Mrs. Frothingham, a federal taxpayer, attacked a federal grant-in-aid program for ma-
ternal health and child welfare as beyond federal cognizance. See p. 486 infra.
A unanimous Court held that the state's objection in its own behalf was nonjusticiable:
"[W]e are called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property, nor rights of
dominion over physical domain, not quasi sovereign rights actually invaded or threat-
ened but abstract questions of political power, of sovereignty, of government." Id. at
484-85. The objection as parens patriae in behalf of its citizens fared no better: "[I]t
is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations
with the Federal Government." Id. at 485-86. Accord, Jones ex rel. Louisiana v.
Bowles, 322 U.S. 707 (1944) (per curiam); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927); cf.
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). See generally Bickel, The Voting Rights
Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 80-93.
97. For instance, had the legislation provided the TVA with an exclusive franchise
to operate in the area served by Tennessee Electric, the plaintiff could have challenged
federal authority to establish TVA as well as the franchise; cf. Ashwander v. T.V.A.,
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
98. See note 46 supra.
99. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
100. The Attorney General's motion to dismiss was granted by the district court.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79 (1949). The Supreme Court reversed on standing, 5-3.
Six opinions were filed in the case, one by each member of the majority and one by
the three dissenters. Four Justices in the majority joined in the idea that the de-
famatory character of the listing afforded standing.
The case began in 1948 and was decided by the Supreme Court in 1951. Three
.years later the committee was still engaged in unsuccessful litigation to obtain a judg-
ment on the merits of its claim that being listed as subversive was violative of its
constitutional rights. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 870
(D.C. Cir. 1954). On February 15, 1955, the committee announced that "it had dis-
solved because of inability to function in the face of continuing government 'persecu-
tion."' W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 146 n.1 (5th
ed. 1970).
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When the Court feels that the private analogue is unacceptable,
it has ignored the private rules and granted standing.10' Alterna-
tively, where the private rules do not mesh well with regulatory ar-
rangements, the Court has denied relief to persons seemingly entitled
under the private law.10 2
II. Toward a Theory of Claims in Suits Against
Administrative Agencies
It should be apparent that the rubric of standing is misleading.
Standing serves to sort out the elements of a cause of action. These
are issues better addressed under the law governing claims for relief.
The variables of interest, harm, duty, and protection remain rele-
vant, but they go directly to whether a litigant has stated a claim
for relief. The relevant principles and precedents are not confined
to cases dealing with standing, but are a part of an older and broader
framework in which courts formulate rules to resolve claims. With-
out seeking overall solutions the following sections of the article ex-
amine several areas that have been or are troublesome in the law
of standing to show that the law of claims offers criteria and jus-
tifications that are pertinent to the resolution of these problems.
101. See pp. 460-61 infra; cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-91 (1958); Shields
v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
102. In Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930), the Court
never considered the private tort of interference with advantageous business relation-
ships, the conditions for which would have been met by the ICC's alteration of the
preexisting rate relationship between the shipper and railroad, absent lawful justi-
fication. Under such a common law tort analysis, the ICC as a third party could be
seen to have intervened to alter the preexisting relationship between the complainant
and the railroad by increasing the rate formerly charged. If the former rate were not
preferential, the intervention was gratuitous and actionable as an unjustified inter-
ference, even though the railroad might have increased the charge on its own. Pro-
fessor Jaffe notes that the tort requires an intentional interference, which perhaps
was lacking here because the ICC was concerned with the welfare of others, the
in-town sellers. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 512. This is not per-
suasive, however, for such a concern is not inconsistent with an intent to alter the
relationship between the railroad and the complainant. Indeed it includes just such
an intent. Liability does not require "malice." See generally 1 F. HARPER &- F. JAMES,
supra note 79, §§ 6.11-.12, at 510-17; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 766-67 (1939). But, in
the strikingly similar case of Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States,
263 U.S. 143 (1923), the requisite conditions for the tort were not met and standing
could not be established under any analysis since the ICC reduced the rate paid by
the competing shipper rather than increase that of the complainant. Yet any realistic
appraisal of the concerns of the Transportation Act or of the complaining shippers
would not distinguish these cases as this tort analysis does. Unlawful interference did,
however, confer standing in C.B.S. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). This tort
has become a convenient basis for standing in some modern cases. See Air Reduction
Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433
F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
Standing to Challenge Administrative Action
A. Judicial Power and Statutory Claims for Relief
The first area for examination is the adjudication of claims found-
ed on a statute which delegates enforcement and administration of
a regulatory program to a public agency. The lack of a provision
for judicial review or standing 03 negates a legislative intent to es-
tablish new private interests that can be vindicated through the
judicial process. The Government has argued recently that a dis-
cernible intent to protect particular persons or groups does not au-
tomatically confer judicial review, since the intent by itself does not
establish that protection should be effectuated through the provi-
sion of judicial remedies at the request of private persons. 04 Instead,
the absence of statutory review provisions indicates that the interests
are committed to the safe-keeping of the agency.' 05 There is, how-
103. See p. 429 supra.
104. Brief for United States at 13-22, Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1
(1968). The Court rejected this argument in upholding a claim by a private utility
company that a proposed TVA expansion was in violation of a statutory limitation
in the TVA charter restricting it to the area "for which the Corporation or its dis-
tributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957." The company
alleged that it already served the proposed area and would suffer a loss of business
from the expansion. The Court predicated standing on its finding that the primary
objective of the area limitation was "the protection of private utilities from TVA
competition," and did not address the government's argument on statutory review
except to cite two statutory review ICC cases as authority for basing standing on
protective intent. The Court still recognizes that there is a distinction, Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972), though it is doubtful that it has any conse-
quences, see note 105 infra. The lack of a statutory review provision formed the
basis for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's well-known dissent in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 311 (1944), a case in which the Court upheld standing without a review provision
for the plaintiff and without clearly finding a private law interest.
105. This view contributed to the Court's refusal to look to statutory protective
purposes in cases of nonstatutory review. The Court now seems to have narrowed or
obliterated the distinction between statutory and nonstatutory review, but without
explanation for the change. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6
(1968). See also references to the APA in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732
(1972); Barlow v. Collins, 897 U.S. 159, 165 (1970); and Association of Data Processing
Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The reference is to § 10 of the APA,
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (1970), amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 1009-09(a) (1964), which provides:
[E]xcept to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law . . . [a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
Though a source of controversy, the section has not explicitly been construed by
the Court. The general understanding until recently was that it summarized the
categories of standing familiar in 1946, the time of enactment. Hence "legal wrong"
iefers to the private law standard used in nonstatutory review cases. "Adversely af-
fected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute" refers to the
statutory policies relied on in statutory review proceedings. See Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955);
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, 413, 415 (1946) (views of then Attorney
General Clark); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 528-30. The contrasting
view, advocated mainly by Professor Davis, would restrict "within the meaning of a
relevant statute" to persons "aggrieved"; "adversely affected," would thus refer to
persons adversely affected or injured in fact. The statute does not support this reading
and the change entailed in it would have been a remarkable alteration of existing law.
The Court has suggested a third alternative. It seems to have assumed that "within
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ever, an adequate rationale for judicial recognition of these claims
in another area of judge-made law. This is the implied cause of action
in private lawsuits-the judicial practice of affording civil remedies
to persons within the protections of and injured by the breach of
statutes and regulations which do not provide for private remedies. 00
This tradition demonstrates that there is no antithesis between pub-
lic mechanisms of enforcement and protected private interests and
that legislative silence is not an obstacle to the application of ju-
dicial principles of redress. This reservoir of judicial power stems
from jurisdiction over a case and from an allegation that an interest
protected by a legislative policy has been disregarded. 10 7
At one time this doctrine primarily operated in tort actions, par-
ticularly negligence suits, in which the common law rules apparently
provided the basis for the claim and the statute merely supplied a
standard of conduct. 08 In the twentieth century, especially in federal
courts, it spread to fields in which the conduct was not actionable
under common law principles.10 9 In these areas broad federal regu-
latory programs, such as securities legislation, had been enacted spe-
cifically to remedy common law deficiencies. 1 0 Indeed, as Judge
the meaning of a relevant statute" does not refer to or require a statutory review
provision, but goes directly to the policy and purposes of the statute authorizing
agency action. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970). This interpretation does away with any distinction between
statutory and nonstatutory review proceedings in respect to standing, except where a
public statutory standing provision such as that in F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470 (1940), is invoked. In that case the standing provision, not statutory policy,
confers review.
The latter approach is not an unreasonable construction of the Act, though it was
not the law of 1946. But the view that § 10 incorporates the understanding of 1946
is not persuasive. Standing law in 1946 was largely judge-made, a product of common
law elucidations. And its boundaries were neither fixed nor frozen. Section 10, like
most standing and review provisions, appears to leave the ground rules of court-
agency relationships to judicial development. But cf. Scott, supra note 1, at 659, 668.
106. See generally Hill, supra note 27, at 1119-22, 1135-40; Katz, supra note 88, at
8-29; Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REv.
453 (1933); O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REv.
231 (1964); Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MOD.
L. REv. 233 (1960); Note, Implying Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARV. L. RFv. 285 (1963).
107. This judicial action has ancient common law roots. See Katz, supra note 88, at
8-29; Landis, supra note 29, at 213-22.
108. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1914).
109. See, e.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323
U.S. 192 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (black railroad
workers entitled to an injunction and damages against a labor union for breach of a
statutory duty to represent all members of the craft); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World
Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (airline discrimination against passenger); Reit-
master v. Reitmaster, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (publication of an intercepted com-
munication); Neches Canal Co. v. Miller & Vidor Lumber Co., 24 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.
1928) (obstruction of stream in violation of Rivers and Harbors Act).
110. Cases in the securities field reveal an initial dependence on common law
principles of liability and a steady growth toward less restrictive concepts formulated
especially for the statutory action. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
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Friendly has observed, the case for implication is now strongest when
the statute imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law,
since in these circumstances alternative theories of relief are not
available. 1 '
Absent contrary legislative intent, courts have allowed private ac-
tions by those whom the statute was designed to protect when there
has been a breach of a statutory command or duty,1 2 except where
such actions are inconsistent with the basic design or implementa-
tion of a program.113 The intricate administrative and regulatory
factors in these cases, the comprehensiveness of agency authority, and
established notions of enforcement discretion would appear strongly
to militate against the creation of private actions. Instead, there is a
marked presumption in favor of implying such actions.114 In es-
tablishing such actions courts have not relied upon congressional in-
tent as derived from ordinary canons of statutory construction, since
any legislative purpose in regard to these actions is unclear, particu-
375 (1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 n.12 (5th Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540
(2d Cir. 1967); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-67 (Ist Cir. 1966); List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Joseph v. Farnsworth
Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1952). See generally Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1041
(1960).
Ill. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966). See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Com-
mon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964); O'Neil, supra note 106, at 259; Note, supra
note 106.
112. See cases cited notes 109-10 supra. Federal securities legislation also has been
a prolific source of implied claims. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d
1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Baird v. Franklin, -141 F.2d 238
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 US. 737 (1944); 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3299-3310(Supp. 1969). See also Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 404 U.S.
6 (1971) (§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453
F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971) (registration requirements in § 13(d) of the 1934 Act); Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969) (Investment Com-
pany Act); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (stockbroker can
sue customers under § 10(b)); cases cited note 110 supra. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra
at 937-40; 3 id. chs. 11 & 12; 5 id. 2892-2905; 6 id. chs. 11 & 12 (Supp. 1969). The Aid
to Dependent Children title of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970), has
given rise to a multitude of suits in the last decade. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
113. See, e.g., J.I. Case & Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v.
Eastern Freightways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S.
-164 (1959); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(1951); cf. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 91, 201-04 (1967). See
generally O'Neil, supra note 106, at 264-69.
114. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-22 (1970), and the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Black, id. at 430-35; Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 224 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), quoted with approval in Wheeldin
v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Hill, supra
note 27, at 1121.
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larly where the civil remedy created may be in addition to a number
of explicit statutory ones." 5
Two variables suggest the basis for this vast growth of federal de-
cisional law at the periphery of federal statutes. The first is a dis-
cernible intent to protect or benefit a class of persons; the second
is the inadequacy of other administrative or judicial remedies to
prevent or redress the harm. The more clearly it is established that
alternative remedies fail in theory and practice, the stronger the case
for implying private actions.116 These variables are crucial, because
the practice is built on a judicially perceived principle of justice-
to provide effective redress for injuries flowing from violations of
legislative and administrative commands. Instrumentalist goals, such
as deterrence or effectuating regulatory policy, are secondary.
A recent Supreme Court case illustrates this process of implication.
In J.L Case v. Borak," 7 shareholders alleging violation of the dis-
closure requirements of § 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,"18
sought rescission or damages for a merger consummated with the
use of proxies. The Supreme Court observed that § 14(a) was de-
signed to "prevent management or others from obtaining authoriza-
tion for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate dis-
closure in proxy solicitation" in recognition of "fair corporate suf-
frage."'1 9 Although the statute made no reference to a private right
of action, "among its chief purposes [was] the 'protection of inves-
tors,' which certainly [implied] the availability of judicial relief where
necessary to achieve that result."'120 Despite its broad enforcement
power, the Court found that the Securities and Exchange Commission
could not before distribution determine the truth of the facts set
out in all the proxy statements filed with it.' 21 A private remedy
was supplied because federal courts must "'adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief' when federally secured rights are
invaded." 22
115. See Hill 1120-21.
116. The obstacles to recovery on the basis of common law fraud were an impor-
tant factor in decisions implying federal remedies to purchasers and sellers under the
federal securities acts. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1683 (2d ed. 1961). The absence
of other effective remedies can be seen in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 404 U.S. 388 (1971); J.I. Case & Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964); Reitmaster v. Reitmaster, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).117. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
119. 377 U.S. at 431.
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 433. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the Court
ruled that federal remedies for violations of § 14(a), such as rescission, were not to
be governed by the restrictive common law principles of damage and proximate cause
used in fraud and deceit actions.
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Similarly, in an action involving administrative conduct, the com-
plainant often invokes a protective intent underlying a regulatory
provision and claims that it has been disregarded to his detriment.
Although the statute may be silent on remedies, the plaintiff is call-
ing upon the judicial power over a case to make principled choices
among traditional remedies to redress injury to a protected interest.
Moreover, when an agency is the defendant, the administrative-regu-
latory difficulties in private lawsuits are largely eliminated. Other
doctrines-exhaustion, ripeness, and finality-insure that the agency
has acted on the subject matter of the litigation and that its views
are before the court.123
Significantly, the plaintiff seeking relief from agency disregard of
a protected interest is in the same position of distress as a plaintiff
in a private lawsuit. He is maintaining that a rule, enacted for the
benefit of persons in his situation, has been disregarded and that a
court is the only available forum for effective relief.12 4 Furthermore,
given the catch-all judicial review provision in the Administrative
Procedure Act,125 legislative silence should count for no more here
than in regard to private claims. The presumption of private remedies
has a powerful counterpart in the law of judicial review, since "ju-
dicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will
not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such
was the purpose of Congress."' 126 Calling an interest protected, how-
ever, in controversies with administrative agencies masks a variety
of degrees of protection. These may range from a clear-cut legislative
command to heed the interest in particular circumstances-the right
to full and truthful disclosure in corporate proxies-to a highly rela-
tive and contingent mandate to consider the interest as one among
many in reaching determinations-the recreational and ecological
values of an area in planning highways.' 27
123. See generally DAvis TREATISE, supra note 1, at §§ 19.01-21.10 (Supp. 1970). Pri-
mary jurisdiction requires that issues within an agency's specialized field must initially
be decided by the agency rather than the court. At one time primary jurisdiction pro-
vided a reason for not allowing private causes of action under a regulatory statute.
See T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). It is no longer a rigid obstacle,
though perhaps still a factor in implying private actions. See Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v.
Eastern Freightways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962). See generally JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL,
supra note 1, at 121.
124. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL 475.
125. Section 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970), provides: "Agency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency action for which there is no oiher adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review."
126. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). See also Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397
U.S. 598 (1970). See generally JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL 336-37, 339.
127. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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A variety of modern planning and allocation programs necessarily
affect many interests and call for a balancing and an attempt at har-
monizing them. 28 Thus the narrower protections in such programs
are not a product of diminished legislative regard and should not
count for less because they are relative to other values. There is no
legislative mandate nor are there appropriate judicial standards for
ranking protected interests. Contingent interests are not less impor-
tant to protected groups and their disregard may be as frequent and
as harmful as violation of broader protections.12 9 Consistent remedial
policy calls for redress whenever a protected interest is disregarded.
Thus, the principles applied in the private cases are relevant to these
interests too.
There is another difference between private lawsuits and suits
against agencies which might be thought to restrict judicial power.
Since agency litigation involves inspection of the acts of another branch
of government, judicial intrusion in the public or political domain
should counsel greater restraint in establishing remedies. 130 Judicial
review of administrative agencies, however, has long prevailed as the
norm.13 The general risks have been thought justified by the func-
tions of review and minimized by understandings about its scope. 32
Accordingly, intrusiveness cannot be an objection to review generally.
B. Judicial Power and Nonstatutory Claims for Relief
Intervention on behalf of a protected statutory interest reduces
the risk of judicial lawmaking. Instead of authoring a rule governing
primary duty, courts work out the remedial implications of legislative
standards in accordance with judicial principles of redress. 33 But
in the arena of judicial review, as in other areas, there are situations
128. See, e.g., Udall v. F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v.
A.E.C., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. C.A.B., 420 F.2d 188
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Fuel Research Council, Inc. v. F.P.C., 374 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1967);
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); City of Houston v. CA.B., 317 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Road Review League
v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Vegetable & Melons Transcontinental East-
bound, 335 I.C.C. 798 (1970); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 27 AD. L. 2D 877 (FTC 1970).
See generally T. LowE, THE POLITICS OF DISORDER (1971), reviewed, Jaffe, 24 STAN. L.
Rv. 587 (1972); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1245-51,
1265-70 (1966).
129. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION 51-107, 231-44 (1971); Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA.
L. REV. 1069, 1074-77, 1092-98 (1971); Reich, supra note 128, at 1247-57.
130. See Scott, supra note 1, at 683-90; cf. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at
1475-76.
131. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL 320-42.
132. See 4 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 1, at 31.
133. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 28, at 488-500, 577.
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where it is appropriate for courts to formulate substantive rules gov-
erning claims, 134 although the statute authorizing agency action does
not itself confer protection. Judicial power in such circumstances is
not restricted to borrowing the private rules of actionability; courts
may formulate and apply principles appropriate for challenges to
agency action.
The statute under which an agency acts is the primary source of
law for resolving conflicts over the exercise of its authority, but other
statutes in the United States Code also may be applicable. Thus in
Southern Steamship Co. v. N.L.R.B.,' 35 involving dismissal of seamen
for striking, the Court admonished the Board for "single-mindedly"
applying the unfair labor practice provisions of the National Labor
Act without accommodating the anti-mutiny policy of the Mutiny
Act.' 30 Similarly, would-be competitors may rely upon national an-
titrust policy in challenging agency authorization of an exclusive
long-term maritime terminal or other venture with monopolistic im-
plications.137 Judicial review, in such cases, permits the broader per-
spective of a generalist tribunal to complement the narrower view of
the specialist agency pursuing a defined mission. 3 s In charging a
court with integrating inconsistent or conflicting national policies, the
function provides a broad array of national programs as a relevant
source of law for private claims.
In addition, courts apply public common law formulated to deal
specifically with agency action and judicial review. These include
familiar principles that govern the scope of review on questions of
law and fact, the boundaries of agency discretion, primary jurisdic-
tion, and numerous other incidents of judicial agency relationships,
which are rarely specified by statute.139 The rules dealing directly
134. The development of federal common law since Erie has been considerable,
see Friendly, supra note 111.
135. 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
136. Id. at 47.
137. Marine Space Endosures v. F.M.C., 420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. United
States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334 (1959); N.B.C. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-24 (1943).
138. See Al. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 52 (1968).
139. Instead of deciding de novo on all matters of law, courts have worked out
intricate rules for determining which questions are subject to a full measure of re-
view and which ones are within agency discretion. This is a large part of the common
law of review. Compare Grey v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), and N.L.R.B. v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), with Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330
U.S. 485 (1947), and Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S.
441 (1947). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
See generally JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 556-85. The doctrines governing
the timing of review, exhaustion of administrative remedies, primary jurisdiction, and
finality are entirely judge-made. See F.P.C. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S.
621 (1972) (primary jurisdiction); National Laundry Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (ripeness); Nor-Am Agr. Products v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133, 1151 (7th Cir.
1970) (finality and exhaustion).
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with claims, however, are scattered and piecemeal, since they devel-
oped as ad hoc responses to cases involving principles of fairness and
legality. Not conceived of by courts or commentators as a systematic
or comprehensive body of law, 14  their nonconstitutional and non-
statutory character is rarely recognized or articulated. Private law
standing formulations have been antithetical to the conception of a
common law of claims against the government and our tendency to
think of claims against officials in constitutional terms has shadowed
this area of judicial lawmaking. Constitutional courts are, however,
"the acknowledged architects and guarantors of the integrity of the
legal system,"'1 4 1 responsible for the effectuation of values upon which
unity and coherence rest. This requires judicial formulation of non-
statutory criteria of validity. Such reasoned elaboration from prin-
ciples of legality rather than from explicit statutory commands is an
affirmative lawmaking exercise. But the courts are the most suitable
institution for elaborating the values of a legal system in particular
cases.
1 42
Their power is most operative in cases dealing with fundamental
aspects of legality: retroactive sanctions and application of legislative
rules, 43 unequal imposition of sanctions on persons similarly situat-
ed,- 4  unjustifiable inequality in treatment of taxpayers,14 r preven-
tion of unconscionable injury from reliance on official advice, 4 6 es-
sentials of fair procedures in hearings,147 bias and agency mixture of
functions, 48 avoidance of ad hoc impositions of sanctions without
rules, 49 ethical conduct of lawyers, 50 and agency duties to persons
140. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 591.
141. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL 589. Professor Jaffe does not, however, articulate this
role of a court in regard to the function of formulating claims; he discusses it in con-
nection with review of questions of law but does not mention it in regard to private
standing.
142. Cf. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
143. See, e.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932);
N.L.R.B. v. Guy Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952); cf. N.L.R.B. v. Majestic
Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966).
144. See, e.g., C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. F.T.C., 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd sub
nom. Moog Industries v. F.T.C., 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
145. See, e.g., I.B.M. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1028 (1966).
146. See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951). But cf. Federal Crop Ins.
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
147. See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945); Wirtz v. Baldor
Electric Co., 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963); N.L.R.B. v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 175
F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949).
148. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Cinderella Career
& Finishing Schools, Inc. v. F.T.C., 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970); American Cyanamid
Co. v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
149. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
150. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1952).
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who are the subjects of adverse administrative action.151 Although
some of these determinations might have been predicated on the Con-
stitution, many of the situations do not lend themselves to the gen-
erality and ramifying effects of constitutional rules. The Constitution
is a backdrop for the exercise of this power, as it often is for statu-
tory interpretation, 152 but the power is seen more clearly as devel-
oping a common law rather than a constitutional law of judicial
review.
A few of these areas mentioned above warrant explication. There
is an unbroken series of cases in which the Court has insisted that
an agency adhere to its procedural regulations, even when they are
merely gratuitous rather than required by statute or the Constitu-
tion.153 Agency action in violation of a regulation is held to be "law-
less."'I 4 Equal treatment and administrative regularity are at the
bottom of these rulings. But it is decidedly not equal protection. Rule
deviation is not transformed into constitutional error without a show-
ing of purposeful discrimination. 155
Another line of cases in the courts of appeals establish that despite
broad discretionary authority to choose among remedies and modify
substantive rules, an agency may not retroactively impose sanctions
for conduct that was lawful or otherwise socially approved. 56 The
151. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); American School of Mag-
netic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
152. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). See generally
Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment
on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1560-61 (1963).
153. See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); N.L.R.B. v. Carpenters, 261
F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1958); McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1954). But cf.
McKenna v. Seaton, 259 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 (1958).
154. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 121 (1946). See generally Berger, Do Regu-
lations Really Bind Regulators?, 62 Nw. L. REV. 137 (1967).
155. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944): "The unlawful administration by state
officers of a state statute fair on its face resulting in unequal application to those
who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there
is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination."
Id. at 7. The meaning of purposeful is not uniform, but depends on the context of
the equal protection challenge. In the above formulation purposeful is used in a weak
sense to require proof that the violation of state law was not solely due to inadvertent
error. Challenges to discretionary state choices, such as sentencing of recidivists, require
a demonstration that invidious criteria have been employed. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448(1962). For yet other kinds of state practices, such as a systematic failure to provide
free appeals to indigents, the effects alone are sufficient to show purposeful dis-
crimination. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But cf. Ely, Legislative and Adminis-
trative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1287-89 (1970).
156. See, e.g., Retail &- Wholesale Union v. N.L.R.B., 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
N.L.R.B. v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960); N.L.R.B. v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955). Compare N.L.R.B. v. Guy Atkinson
Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952), with Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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scope of protected conduct is determined by the extent to which re-
liance was reasonably founded upon existing rules of law, statutory
purposes, or social mores.1' 7 Protection of these reasonable expec-
tations is not an application of due process or the ex post facto pro-
vision in a civil context. Rather, it is sufficient that the retroactive
application is "altogether out of proportion to the public ends ac-
complished. It is the sort of thing our system abhors."l1s
Most of these public common law rulings concern the validity of
agency action, but some adjudicate other aspects of a claim, such
as agency duty to a complainant. Thus there are several older stand-
ing cases that do not use the established categories of protective
statutory intent or private law actionability. An example is School
of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty.' 9 The Postmaster General de-
termined that the complainant's business of curing disease by mental
exercise was fraudulent and thereupon barred his use of the mails.
The statute did not prescribe procedures for judicial review. The
appropriate private action was unclear and the Court did not look
for it. Referring to itself as a court of equity, it invoked the broad
principle that the acts of officials must be justified by some law:
"[I]n case an official violates the law to the injury of an individual
the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief."' 00
Harmon v. Brucker'61 involved a challenge to the Secretary of
the Army's power to issue a dishonorable discharge based upon con-
duct occurring before entry into the armed forces. The clain for
relief was discussed in much the same terms as McAnnulty, which
provided the principal authority for the decision: "Generally judi-
cial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a
government official which is in excess of his expressed or implied
powers.1
162
157. Compare H & F Binch Co. Plant v. N.L.R.B., 456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972),
with Retail & Wholesale Union v. N.L.R.B., 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In the
latter case Judge McGowan noted the relevant factors:
Among the considerations that enter into a resolution of the problem are (I)
whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule
represents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely attempts
to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the part) against
whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the
burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party , and (5) the statutory interest
in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.
Id. at 390. See also S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (Jackson, J., dib-
senting).
158. N.L.R.B. v. Guy Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 149 (9th Cir. 1952).
159. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
160. Id. at 108.
161. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
162. Id. at 581-82. See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Stark v. Wickard,
321 U.S. 288 (1944).
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In Gonzalez v. Freemen,163 the most recent case in this area, the
plaintiff had been debarred for five years from contracting with the
government for alleged falsification of official certificates. Although
he was thus seeking government contracts and fell within the no
protected interest tradition of Perkins, the Court of Appeals by
then-Judge Burger enjoined the order. "Considerations of basic fair-
ness" prohibited debarment on a case-by-case basis without regula-
tions prescribing offenses and standards and without procedures guar-
anteeing a hearing and findings based on the record. 0 4 As for
Perkins the court merely noted that "[a]n allegation of facts which
reveal an absence of legal authority or basic fairness in the method
of imposing debarment presents a justiciable controversy . . .,.
The need for and appropriateness of the exercise of judicial power
over claims is well illustrated in a special group of recent cases in
which injury to the complainant was highly particularized and per-
sonal, but no statute afforded protection against it. The plaintiffs
were disappointed bidders for government contracts who challenged
the manner and circumstances surrounding bid solicitation and con-
tract award. 166 Until recently bidders were without standing be-
cause they had no legal interest in obtaining a government contract.
The network of procurement statutes and regulations structuring and
defining methods of awarding government contracts was said to pro-
mote efficiency of the government and hence benefit the public.
They therefore conferred no protections upon private business. 167
163. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
164. Id. at 578.
165. Id. at 574-75.
Profe,.Nor Davis regards these cases as precedents for his proposition that injury in
fact confers standing to sue. DAVis TREATISE, supra note 1, at 712-13, 727 (Supp. 1970).
Therc is such a right to relief in these cases because the direct injury sustained is a
hey part of the claims for relief entitling the claimants to procedural fairness or ad-
rminisitrative regularity under principles formulated by the court. Contrary to Pro-
fteor Davis' generalization, however, the rules establishing agency duty as part of
these claims for relief do not mean that injury combined with alleged invalidity con-
fers a right to a hearing, published regulations, or other relief in different circum-
stances. Principles of legality are not that broad.
166. See, e.g., Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk
Heating 8: Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Keco Indus. v. United
states, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859
(D.C. Cir. 1970). But see Merriam v. Kunzig, 347 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Gary
Aircraft v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1972). See generally Grossbaum,
Procedural Fairness in Public Contracts: The Procurement Regulations, 57 VA. L. REv.
171 (1971); Speidel, Judicial and Administrative Review of Government Contract Awards,
47 Lw -' CoNm-.P. PROB. 63 (1972).
167. See, e.g., Edelman v. Federal Housing Admin., 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Gray Line Water Tours, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962); Woaldridge Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 171 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 903
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This analysis and its effect on judicial review was turned about in
Scanwell Laboratories Inc. v. Thomas,0 8 where the court of ap-
peals ruled that doubts should be resolved in favor of affording stand-
ing to bidders who, although without a protected private interest,
seek to litigate cases in which the public interest demands a hear-
ing on the merits. Subsequent cases in the District of Columbia
Circuit, including some decided after Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp, 69 have accepted this explanation of
bidder standing and the importance of review in serving "the public
interest in having agencies follow the regulations which control gov-
ernment contracting."' 7 0
The avoidance of costly disruptions and delays in the expeditious
flow of the procurement process from judicial interventions, how-
ever, has recently emerged as a competing public interest. This in-
terest imposes severe restraints upon review and especially upon
declaratory and equitable relief, the remedies most disruptive of
quick and final purchases and also most effective for the challenging
bidder.171
Significantly the opinions striking the balance between the public
interest in procedural regularity and government efficiency do not
seem to recognize any competing private interest in the complaining
bidder; the judicial vision is restricted to operation of the system
in conformity with rules and regulations and the costs of disruption.
The general interest in abstract legality, however, is not likely to
(1949). For recent reliance on Perkins see Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 342 F.
Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1972). See generally Note, Standing to Challenge Agency Action
by Bidders on Government Contracts, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 558, 559 (1971).
168. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In this case the second lowest bidder on an
advertisement for instrument landing systems challenged the award on the ground
that the winning bidder had not complied with an eligibility condition that the
contractor have operational systems already installed and tested by the FAA.
169. 397 U.S. 150 (1970), rev'g 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969). See discussion pp. 494-96
infra.
170. 424 F.2d at 861. See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d
1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ballerina Pen
Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970); cf. Keco Industries v. United States, 428
F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Merriam v. Kunzig, 347 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1972), denied
standing on the ground that Scanwell's private attorney-general concept was incon-
sistent with the formulation in Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970), decided shortly after Scanwell. See 347 F. Supp. at 723.
The court in Scanwell also relied on § 10 of the APA to reject the defense of
sovereign immunity, a view that is frequently advocated but without clear support in
the APA or its history. See Byse and Fiocca, supra note 13, at 326-31; Crampton, supra
note 13, at 428-36. For a rejection of this view see Cotter Corp. v. Seaborg, 370 F.2d
686, 692 n.15 (10th Cir. 1966).
171. Steinthal &. Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971), demonstrates this
conflict; cf. Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also
Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684, 687-88 (D.D.C. 1970).
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outweigh a vivid demonstration of the actual costs from delay, such
as a rapid need for the commodity. 172
This approach gives insufficient weight to a private interest worthy
of recognition under judicially-formulated principles governing
claims. Bidders are asserting a substantial and costly reliance on the
system of procurement rules. Departures not only defeat such re-
liance, but also disappoint reasonable expectations of a profitable
contract. The action challenged entails unequal treatment and pref-
erences in a setting controlled by the government that would seem
particularly to call for scrupulous fairness. Since they concern sen-
sitive aspects of the legal order, the elements of induced reliance
and profit expectations in a system promising equality of access place
the bidder's claim within an area of judicial scrutiny. The reason-
able expectation interest is like that in retroactivity cases; 173 the
equal treatment claim is quite similar to cases insisting on adherence
to regulations.1 74 Recognition of this private interest may make out
a private claim for relief; it does not solve the problems of timing
and form of relief. Interventions still involve costs, but recognition
that there is a private claim for relief at least reveals that there is
more than an abstract public interest to be balanced against the costs.
Judicial authority over claims can also be compared with the
failure of standing to take account of all the pertinent variables in
cases in which commercial establishments seek to challenge variances
and waivers granted under zoning legislation to other commercial
operations. Most courts agree that a business in a business district
is without standing to challenge a variance afforded a competing
business to operate in a residential area.175 These cases are celebrated
as instances where illegality and harm do not confer standing.176 Fo-
cusing on the avoidance of competition as the only relevant factor,
the reasoning fails to account for the fact that statutorily protected
or not, people do in fact place reliance on legal arrangements and
172. See, e.g., Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wheelabrator
Corp. V. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Speidel, supra note 166,
at 63-69, 87-94; Note, The New Law of Threshold Standing: The Effect of Sierra Club
on Jus Tertii and on Government Contracts, 1973 DUKE L.J. 218, 240-50.
173. See notes 156-58 supra.
174. See notes 153-55 supra. Those cases establish that the violation of a regulation
need not be deliberate to be actionable.
175. The general rule is that a "mere" competitor cannot sue to enjoin a non-
conforming use or appeal from a variance or change in zoning. See, e.g., London v.
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 149 Conn. 282, 179 A.2d 614 (1962); Cord Meyer Develop-
ment Co. v. Bell Bay Drugs, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 211, 229 N.E.2d 44, 282 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1967);
2 A. RATHKoPF & C. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 40-14, 40-16 (3d ed.
1956).
176. See Jaffe, Standing Again, supra note 1, at 637.
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that in some instances that reliance is worthy of respect. Of course
legal arrangements are subject to all manner of change, but these
challenges are to allegedly improper alterations under stable and
unmodified legal programs.
More concretely, business A, at a large investment, establishes a
restaurant on a traffic circle. There is no other site available on or
near the circle for another business except for one that is in a resi-
dential zone. Some years later another restaurant obtains a variance
to operate on the site in the residential zone and A sues.177 A's re-
liance on the zoning law and regular administration of that law,
as manifested in his investment, is a private interest worthy of some
protection. It certainly warrants a better response than the assertion
that the statute on which he relied was not intended to protect him
and that the common law favors competition. Interestingly enough,
when courts are not transfixed by the private common law preference
for competition, they do perceive and credit the precise form of
reliance on rules and regular administration which is involved here.
Hence, challenges by homeowners under the same zoning laws are
upheld on the ground that people do and should reasonably rely on
the guarantee of arrangements in zoning legislation. 178 This reason-
ing makes plain that a legal system that promises some amount of
regularity cannot wholly ignore the reliance it induces even where
such reliance is not invited. Here, as in other situations, there is
ample judicial power to vindicate such claims.
C. Third-Party Claims for Relief
Interests protected under administrative programs are often mul-
titudinous and diffuse. Although a number of the many identifiable
groups affected by agency programs are organized for the purpose of
representation, many are not in a position to undertake litigation.
individually or collectively. Indeed, such classes may be unaware of
legislation or of administrative action affecting their interests. There-
fore, their acquiescence in agency action is not approval. 1-t In the
past, left to the safekeeping of an agency, these passive interests were
177. The example is from Circle Lounge & Grill, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324
Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
178. Special damage arising from reliance on existing zoning arrangements is the
rationale in cases upholding suits by neighbors within the zoning district for injuries
to their property from zoning modifications and variances. See, e.g., Garner v. City
of Carmi, 28 111. 2d 560, 192 N.E.2d 816 (1963); Hartnet v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla.
1956); Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946).
179. Cf. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note I, at 479-83; Jaffe, Standing Again,
supra note 1, at 637-38.
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likely to receive limited consideration and solicitude in the adminis-
trative process.' 80 Because agency action often has a direct impact
on persons seemingly outside the circle of protected interests, third-
party standing practices-by which a court acts upon policies favoring
persons and groups not before it'-provide a significant source of
rules of decision for resolving claims against agencies. Such third-
party principles not only permit adjudication of the claims of af-
fected third-party groups but also provide criteria for establishing
protected interests in the litigants before the court. Although third-
party standing may involve a preliminary determination of the
occasions in which one may litigate the rights of others, it is often
a decision on whether the litigant in his own right has protected
interests derived from a policy favoring others. As such, it is not
preliminary but a decision on the merits of a litigant's claim. Rec-
ognition of this distinction is thus important for the appropriate
treatment of litigants.
1. Third-Party Claims Based on Derivative Rights
Cases of constitutional adjudication, where these issues have been
confronted, provide a basis for flexible practices to effectuate third-
party interests. Many of these cases, indeed most of the classic ones, 8 2
have failed to see that the question of third-party standing was
really an issue of one's own claim for relief. They do not dis-
tinguish between invocation of the interests of others as part of
one's own claim and the assertion of a claim of right belonging to
others. The cases, properly viewed, entail a claim by A, the litigant,
that implementation of a legal policy favoring B requires protection
of A in his out of court relationship with B. This does not involve
A's ability to represent and litigate the rights of B; it involves ad-
judication of a claim that belongs to A. Its resolution turns on
whether the scope and purposes of B's protection give rise to deri-
vative protections for the relationship with A. That, of course, is a
matter of claim to be answered in the ordinary way of resolving the
merits, by examination of the scope of and purposes behind con-
stitutional or statutory protections. Characterizing the issue as third-
party standing imports a presumption against adjudication by virtue
180. See pp. 481-82 infra.
181. See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme
Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
182. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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of the general rule restricting a litigant to his own claims, 8 3 im-
plies a vague judicial discretion to deny this special standing and
therefore the claim, 84 and makes resolution turn on whether it is
impractical for third parties with the protected interest to litigate
their own claim.'83 This approach is misleading and inappropriate
in passing on a litigant's own claim for relief.
The abortion controversy, in which the Court ruled that women
had a constitutional right to an abortion during a period of preg-
nancy, offers an example of derivative rights or protection of a re-
lationship. 186 Their right to privacy confers upon others, namely
physicians, a dependent right to perform abortions during this pro-
tected period.' But physicians do not enjoy an independent con-
stitutional right to privacy or freedom to practice medicine generally;
they have a protected interest in performing abortions by virtue of
the policy toward women. Although derivative, physicians may re-
sist interferences with this interest in their own right.
The scope and character of the third-party protection is not as
obvious in other cases, but the claim and inquiry are the same.
Thus, in Barrows v. Jackson'"s the only issue was whether the
established constitutional right of black buyers to be free from
racial convenants implied or necessitated derivative protections in
white sellers to be free from damages for breach of the covenant by
selling to blacks. Whether protection extended to this relationship
was a function of the purposes behind the policy favoring blacks
and the impact of damage suits on those purposes. The relationship
was protected because the policy implied collateral protections for
white sellers and not, in standing terminology, because black buyers
cannot assert their own rights. 8 9
In the famous birth control controversies, Griswold v. Connecti-
183. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961); United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-24 (1960); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
184. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
105-10 (1961); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-24 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 260 (1953).
185. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
186. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
187. The Court upheld the standing of physicians to challenge abortion statutes
without recognizing that there was a third-party issue. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
188. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
189. In explaining the appropriateness of third-party standing, the Court established
a right in third-party purchasers and an impact on that right from damage suits. Given
this formulation of standing, there were no issues left to decide on the merits. See id.
at 257.
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cut'90 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,'0 ' suppliers of contraceptive materials
to married and unmarried purchasers were prosecuted under statutes
forbidding use in Connecticut and distribution to single persons in
Massachusetts. The issue was posed in terms of whether the sup-
pliers might litigate the rights of consumers of birth control devices,
an approach which raises formidable questions about the ability of
consumers to assert their own rights and the impact of the litigation
on them. A realistic inquiry would have denied standing-potential
litigants were plentiful and their rights unaffected by the litigation
before the Court.192
The cases, however, should be viewed as posing two distinct ques-
tions going to the merits: whether the Constitution protected mar-
ried and unmarried persons in their use of contraceptives and if so,
whether the reasons behind that protection further required or guar-
anteed a right of access to contraceptive material. The distributors
were entitled to an adjudication of these contentions. The basic
inquiry-the relationship between enjoyment of a constitutional pro-
tection and guarantees of access-is strikingly similar to the abortion
case. Depending on the scope and purposes behind the constitutional
protection, the answer might be as clear. If, for example, the Court
ruled that forbidding the use of contraceptives by single persons was
a denial of equal protection or a protected liberty,0 3 a distributor
would enjoy a derivative constitutional protection in his dealings
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
191. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WVECHSLER,
supra note 75, at 90, for an interpretation similar to the one offered here.
Another commentator has observed that there is something different about cases in-
volving regulation of a relationship to which one party has constitutional protection.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 514 & n.50.
192. The Court often speaks of the impact of the litigation on the interests or
rights of absent third parties. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), it noted
that "the rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or ad-
v'ersely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have
this kind of confidential relation to them." Id. at 481. If the convictions of the
birth control clinic or contraceptive distributor were sustained, married couples and
single people would not be in a worse position than they were before the litigation.
Absent parties may be better off if the Court does hear and sustain their claim, but
assuming no adverse stare decisis effect, they may not be adversely affected. See also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1972).
193. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 452-55. The Court reversed the conviction
and invalidated the statute on the ground that it denied equal protection by for-
bidding distribution to single persons only. The Court reasoned that if Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), forbade a ban on distribution to married persons, the
underlying right of privacy would prevent restricting access of single persons. Alterna-
tively, if Griswold did not forbid restrictions on access, then equal protection forbade
a restriction limited to single persqns. The decision does establish derivative rights in
persons distributing contraceptives, but the Court described this in the traditional
manner: "We think, too, that our self-imposed rule against the assertion of third-
party rights must be relaxed in this case, just as in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra."
405 U.S. at 444.
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with single persons and a state could not bar distribution to them.19
Although not clearly articulated in suits against administrative
agencies, there are numerous statutory policies which confer or im-
ply collateral protections upon persons challenging agency action.
Such protections, for example, may be implied from provisions whose
overall purpose relates to the national welfare. The process of es-
tablishing claims for relief is the same as in cases involving con-
stitutional litigation. Thus, in Curran v. Laird'" there were several
statutes which together required that the government ship all its cargo
on American ships manned with American seamen to promote the
vitality and emergency availability of American ships in time of war
or other distress. Although this did not specifically establish pro-
tections for private interests, it implied collateral protections suf-
ficient to afford American shipowners and seamen a claim against
deviations from the requirement. Certainly a concern with their well-
being could be derived from the overall purpose. Indeed the court
did find standing for seamen. 196
2. Third-Party Claims Based on Asserting the Rights of Others
The parties in these cases are not seeking to litigate the rights of
others, though these bear closely upon their own claim. There are
situations, however, in which the rubric of third-party standing or
jus tertii is more appropriate, because the litigants are directly as-
serting the interests of third parties,9T7 rather than seeking to pro-
194. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which two private
schools challenged a statute requiring parents to send their children to public schoolh.
A proper analysis would recognize that the constitutional rigbt of parents to direct the
education of their children and to choose among schools implies a further constitu-
tional protection for private schools against statutes threatening their survival. Al-
though upholding the claim of the schools, the Court may hate rested its holding on
the schools' property interest.
195. 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
196. Id. at 124-28. See also N.L.R.B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322
(1951). The National Labor Relations Act once denied the services of the Board to
a union whose officers had not filed noncommunist affidavits. The primary purpose-
to prevent the possibility of political strikes-supports a derivative interest in em-
ployers not to deal with noncompl)ing unions, or more narrowly, to be free from
unfavorable Board orders issued in proceedings initiated by a noncompl)ing union.
The Court so held, but on a different theory. Id. at 325-26.
197. At one time the most common instance was where a party claimed that a
statute, though valid as applied to him, was invalid as applied to third partkis or
situations coming within its terms. Such on-the-face attacks wvere once upheld with
some frequency. See Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Trade-Mark Ca""', lWO
U.S. 82 (1879); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). But the principle of .ce erability
-that a statute, invalid as to some applications,. may be validly applied on other
occasions-and narrowing statutory construction account for the disappuarance of tle\.
claims. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Carmichael v. Southcrn Cool
Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930). Sec gacally
Sedler, supra note 181.
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tect a relationship with them. This is commonly seen in attacks upon
statutes which regulate expression or other fundamental liberties.
Doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth allow a variety of vicarious
claims premised upon the hypothetical impact of the statute on third
persons without regard to the actual conduct of the person object-
ingY~s Operative here is a premise that other persons-the third
parties whose protected interests are adjudicated-may not be willing
or able to bear the burdens of litigation. Therefore normal rules
of standing are relaxed to accommodate these protected interests.
No fixed generalization about third-party claims is possible, be-
cause the result depends on the scope of constitutional protections
and the impact of challenged action on these policies. But the cases
express a flexible principle allowing one with a stake in the pro-
ceedings to invoke and rely upon protected interests of others where
that is a necessary or appropriate way of implementing protection
of such interest. Impracticality of assertion by the class with the
interest, including the burdens of litigation, is plainly relevant to
appropriateness. 199 Thus in Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan2°0 the
Court supported the conclusion that a book publisher could sue to
enjoin informal pressures on book distributors with the statement
that "the distributor who is prevented from selling a few titles is
not likely to sustain sufficient economic injury to seek judicial
vindication of his rights."' ' 1
3. Third-Party Principles in Review of Administrative Action
A number of factors suggest an expansive application of third-
party principles in review of administrative action on nonconstitu-
tional grounds. Foremost there is the clear practical need arising
from the number of classes and groups affected by agency action
that are not in a position to undertake litigation. Second, the de-
termination of third-party claims, like statutory review generally,
primarily involves judicial development of the remedial consequences
of protective legislation. This is also true of implying collateral pro-
tections from statutory policies. In contrast, constitutional adjudica-
tion involves the judicial formulation of primary rules that often
198. See Plummer v. City of Columbus, 94 S. Ct. 17 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969). But cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
199. Set, e.q., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Parh, 396 U.S.'229 (1969); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); cf. Trafficante
v. letropolitn Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
200. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
201. Id. at 65 n.6.
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supersede legislation. The role of the claimant in statutory review
proceedings also differs substantially from his constitutional counter-
part. In many constitutional cases courts seeking to formulate nar-
row rules are concerned with the plaintiff's circumstances and the
impact of the challenged action on him.2 02 Statutory review does
not involve rule formulation; inquiry most typically involves deter-
mining whether the asserted protected interest should have been
considered by the agency and in fact was not, and whether there
is substantial evidence supporting the other interests that were fa-
vored. 20 3 Or a court may confront a question of statutory interpre-
tation in deciding whether the major purposes of the statutory
scheme were contravened by agency action.204 These issues rarely, if
ever, turn on particulars of the claimant; informed resolution does
not require a specially situated plaintiff. Indeed the irrelevancy
of individual plight to these class claims contributes to categorizing
them as public claims.20 5 Hence adequate third-party representation
or presentation is not a major problem in statutory review.
Further, there has been a great deal of derivative representation
in administrative proceedings. Traditional participants in the ad-
ministrative process-producers, broadcasters, and power companies-
have generally asserted the unrepresented interests of various groups.200
Television stations seeking license renewals ritualistically invoke the
protected listener interest in good broadcasting.20 7 Although not
recognized as such, a kind of jus tertii was a part of the Court's
public interest theory in F.C.C. v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,20 s
authorizing persons without a protected private interest to appeal.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Ashwander v. T.V.A.,
297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally BICKEL, supra note
2, at 122-25, 135-43, 169-90.
203. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Udall v. F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 453
F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971); N.L.R.B. v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961);
Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
204. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485 (1947); Addison v.
Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.
v. A.E.C., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra
note 1, at 556-77.
205. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 488-89, 497-98, 506-12.
206. See, e.g., Arrow Trans. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 660-61 n.2 (1963)
(barge line, municipality, and grain purchaser may argue the interests of small grain
purchasers and consumers); I.C.C. v. J.T. Trans. Co., 368 U.S. 81 (1961) (motor car-
riers can argue the needs of shippers); Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (helium producers may enjoin Secretary from requiring government contrac-
tors to purchase their helium needs from him); cf. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1953) (dealer in regulated product may argue as a consumer).
207. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
208. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The case is discussed more extensively at pp. 476-78 infra.
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The approaches, however, differ. Third-party principles vindicate or
extend the protected interests of an identifiable group not before
the Court. Public interest standing looks to the "public" nature of
the issue presented and the general social interest in resolving it.
It is not possible to determine how often jus tertii arises in statu-
tory review or might arise if endorsed. But the fear of crowds that
is sometimes invoked against relaxation of standing doctrine seems
chimerical; the mass of irresponsible litigants which haunts some
older opinions and government briefs has not been found in the
courtroom. In some recent cases209 injured property owners who
relied on environmental protections have been viewed skeptically
by some courts which believed they were not truly motivated by a
concern for the environment. As long as there is no conflict between
a litigant's interest and that which he seeks to represent, there is no
reason why his unprotected interest should disqualify him. His in-
terest makes him an effective advocate for protected third parties.
In Investment Company Institute v. Camp,210 the Court afforded
relief without inquiring into whether the plaintiff had a protected
legal interest. Since injury and illegality, without requirements of
agency duty or obligation to the plaintiff, appeared to be sufficient,
the case suggests an important redefinition of the essentials of a claim
against the government. In this view adjudication is based on the
public interest in vindicating legality because nothing in particular
entitles the litigant to relief.211 Third-party principles offer an ex-
planation of the case that is more consistent with the customary con-
ception of private claims.
The plaintiff mutual fund enterprises challenged the Comptroller
of the Currency's ruling allowing commercial banks to operate an
investment fund which would be competitive with mutual funds.
The authorization allegedly contravened the Glass-Steagell Act of
1933,212 whose overall objective was to prevent commercial banks-
those that receive deposits, lend money, and discount notes-from
engaging on their own account, or through affiliates, in certain in-
209. See, e.g., Pizitz v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1195, 1196 (M.D. Ala. May 1, 1972), aff'd
per curiamn, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972) (action under NEPA deemed "spurious"
because financial rather than environmental interest at stake); Zlotnick v. D.C. Re-
development Fund Agency, 2 ELR 20235 (D.D.C. March 3, 1972) (plaintiff's interest
financial and therefore beyond zone of interest of NEPA); cf. Higgonbotham v. Barrett,
473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971);
Daly v. Volpe, 326 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wash. 1971) (both allowing area residents to
contest federal highway funding).
210. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
211. See Jaffe, Standing Again, supra note 1, at 634-35.
212. Glass-Steagell Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
The Yale Law Journal
vestment activities. 213 Although the merits were subtle, the Court
found that the purposes of the Act required a broad reading of its
prohibitions which "reflected a determination that policies of com-
petition, convenience, or expertise which might otherwise support
the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business
were outweighed by the 'hazards' and 'financial danger' that arise
when commercial banks engage in" investment activities. The pro-
motional incentives of the investment business and a pecuniary stake
in the success of investment opportunities were "destructive of pru-
dent and disinterested commercial banking."214 As Mr. Justice Harlan
noted in his dissent limited to standing, these purposes afforded
mutual fund companies no protection from competitive injury. In-
deed the Act was "adopted despite its anticompetitive effects rather
than because of them,"21 5 and the Court explicitly agreed with the
proposition.2 10
But the conditions for third-party principles were well satisfied.
The plaintiffs were members of the class most directly affected by
the ruling and their stake in the controversy was greater than any
possible litigant. The Glass-Steagell Act plainly created protected
interests favoring bank depositors, customers, and perhaps investors
in securities who might be subject to some of the hazards from banks
engaging in the investment business. These groups constituted an
identifiable but unorganized class which was not likely to undertake
litigation to protest this ruling. Because members of the class were
not likely to have been aware of the ruling or of any actual harm
from it, it cannot be implied that there was none. Conflict of in-
terest legislation, such as this, deals with the mixture of functions
that are seen to pose a danger and not with the harms that may
ensue from the mixture. The protected interest inheres in the func-
tions being separate, and it is infringed when they are not. -1 7 So
viewed, there was no conflict between the interests of the protected
class and of the plaintiff companies.
In these circumstances it is not a large step to find a derivative
213. 401 U.S. at 629.
214. Id. at 630, 634.
215. Id. at 640.
216. Id. at 630, 636. The Court granted zone of interest standing in light of the
decision in Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
401 U.S. at 620-21. This ruling would seem to equate standing with a complaint pre-
senting an arguable claim of administrative invalidity. See p. 496 infra. The circuit
court had considerable difficulty in finding standing. Camp v. Investment Co. Inst.,
420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See id. at 98-100 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); id. at 107
(Burger, J., concurring).
217. Cf. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
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protection for the mutual fund companies from a statute which
seeks to keep two industries entirely separate in the interest of the
customers of each. Such a protection would imply a right in in-
vestment companies to be free from competition from banks in the
offering of investment services.218 Even without such a derivative
interest, the situation is appropriate for the companies to assert the
protected interest of customers who had a claim for relief and a
need for an interested party to assert it. Hence the public function
of judicial review is neither necessary nor helpful in justifying re-
lief in the case. The far-reaching suggestion that the case, in pro-
viding relief upon a showing of invalidity and injury, has redefined
for all cases the essentials of a claim against agency action is inap-
propriate. The Court has done no more than recognize and vindi-
cate a widely-shared private interest under established principles
relating to claims and third-party practice.
III. Recent Developments in Standing and the Law of Claims
Viewing standing as an aspect of the law of claims is particularly
pertinent to two significant developments in the law of judicial
review.
First, during the last decade there has been a revolution in the
scope of participation in the administrative process. Individuals and
gToups presenting novel interests and claims are now entitled to be
heard in federal courts.2 19 While some courts have merely liberalized
218. Se 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (1970). Section 24 prohibits national banks from un-
derwriting securities; § 378 prohibits securities underwriters and dealers from also en-
gaging in commercial or deposit banking. See also Scott, supra note 1, at 665.219. A series of d cisions, primarily in the circuit courts, established the right of
gtoups reprewenting a variety of interests to participate in administrative proceedings
and to chalknge administrative action. See especially Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (organization of
li.,teners entitled to be heard in license renewal proceedings on a claim of racially
biased broadcasting); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1935), curt. denied, 384 U.S. 9-41 (1966) (conservationist organizations and local towns
entitled to demand that the FPC explore the environmental implications of a proposed
hydroelectric project). See also N.W.R.O. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (national
organization of welfare recipients, state affiliate organization, and individual recipients
entitled to intervene as parties in HEW conformity proceeding to consider whether
state welfare practiccs are consistent with standards of the Social Security Act). Per-
haps because the scope of judicial review of agency action remains limited, Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); but cf. Environmental
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and agencies continue
to exercise the lion's share of policymaking responsibility, much of the literature focuses
on participation at the administrative level. See, e.g., J. SAX, supra note 129; Crampton,
The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative
Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972); Comment, Public Participation in Federal Adminis-
trative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 702 (1972).
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the law of standing to accommodate consumers, environmentalists,
and listeners, -2 20 others, perhaps impatient with the standing barrier
and responsive to widespread dissatisfaction with agency performance,
have determined that these litigants have standing as representatives
of the "public interest" and that judicial review serves a "public
function" in the protection of "public values."' -2 1 This concept of
public interest standing focuses on the importance of the issues to
be adjudicated, not on the litigant who presents them. Hence in
the extreme case, public interest standing-"private attorneys general"
in Judge Frank's memorable phrase222-would totally do away with
personal requirements for standing; courts would decide if the case
called for public interest vindication.2 23
It is doubtful that such a grandiose and indiscriminate idea is
necessary or helpful in thinking about broadened participation.
Public interest standing is derived from the recognition that the
new litigants are not within the universe of protected private in-
terests established by older rules of standing. But their interests and
claims are similar to private ones long vindicated in judicial pro-
220. See, e.g., Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). See also note 224 infra. Other
barriers, especially ripeness and reviewability, have also been -relaxed. On ripeness see
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 158 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); National
Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); cf. Port
of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebdaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 70-71
(1970). See generally Vining, supra note 3. On reviewability, see Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra
at 140-41; Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See
generally 4 DAVis TREATisE, supra note 1, § 28.01-.21; DAvis TREATISE, supra note 1,
§ 28.01-.21 (Supp. 1970). But cf. High Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d
52 (9th Cir. 1971).
221. Cases in which the plaintiff is designated or allowed to act as private attorney-
general and review is maintained in the public interest include Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. for the
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scan-
well Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966); Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (D. Minn. 1970).
The literature includes Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant, supra note 1; Jaffe, The Edi-
torial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 768, 774 (1972); Monaghan, supra note 1; Sedler, supra note 1; Vining, supra
note 3, at 1471-75. For historical perspectives see JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1,
at 459-500; Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
222. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943).
223. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 486-94, 530-31; Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant, supra note 1, at 1038. Congressional authorization as a prerequisite for
adjudication of public interest cases has been suggested. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 197 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1371-79.
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ceedings in which restrictive standing rules for review of agency ac-
tion are not employed. By recognizing that standing deals with a
question of claim for relief, these interests can be adjudicated in a
manner consistent with the traditional role of courts.
The second development is represented by a recent series of
standing decisions in which the Court reformulated standing doc-
trine.2 '2 4 In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp 225 and Barlow v. Collins,226 the Court rejected the "protected
legal interest" test because it "goes to the merits" and was therefore
thought inappropriate for the threshold matter of standing.22 7 The
Court prescribed a new two-part test of standing: "The first question
is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused
him injury in fact, economic or otherwise." 228 The second is "whether
the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 229
The Court's new test is not a significant barrier to challenging
administrative action, despite difficulty in applying the zone of in-
terest standard,23 0 but it may be inconsistent with some accepted
purposes behind awarding relief to a particular plaintiff.231 By de-
emphasizing inquiry into the personal interests of the complainant
224. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp. 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,
400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association
of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Other courts had led
the way in expansive standing decisions. See cases cited note 219 supra; Blackhawk
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Peoples v. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Carrington v. City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d 687
(5th Cir. 1969); Norwalk CORE v. Nonvalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968).
225. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
226. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
227. 397 U.S. at 153.
228. Id. at 152.
229. Id. at 153.
230. It appears rare when one affected by administrative action is denied standing
to sue. Often the matter is relegated to a footnote in cases, such as competitor suits,
that would have been troublesome before the Court's decisions. See Ramapo Bank v.
Camp, 425 F.2d 333, 345 n.33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); cf. P.A.M.
News Corp. v. Hardin, 440 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (wire service in agricultural data
news may challenge competition by the Dep't of Agriculture); Armco Steel Co. v.
Stans, 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970) (domestic steel producer entitled to review of de-
cision of Foreign Trade Zones Board granting port power to create customs-free area
in which vessels were to be built with duty-free imported steel). For the occasional
judicial doubt, see, e.g., Allen M. Campbell Gen'l Contractors, Inc. v. Lloyd Wood
Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally cases collected in DAvis TLxT,
supra note 1, § 22.07; Sedler, supra note I, at 479.
For some zone of interest difficulties, see, e.g., Shannon v. Department of H.U.D.,
436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Northwest Residents Ass'n v. Department of H.U.D., 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
231. See pp. 496-97 infra.
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and granting unexplained relief without inquiry into legal interest,
the Court has indirectly endorsed public interest standing.2 32 And in
affirming that standing is or should be a threshold inquiry uncon-
cerned with the merits, and by rejecting legal interest on that basis,
the Court has perpetuated the inappropriate notion of access standing.
A. Public Standing and Claims for Relief
In the seminal case F.C.C. v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station 33
the Court introduced the notion of "public interest" standing. A li-
censed station sought review of authorization of a new competitive
station. As the Court saw the issue, neither the Federal Communi-
cations Act nor common law standards afforded existing stations a
"right" to be free from new competition. It would easily follow
that Sanders was without standing. The Act, however, provided for
review by a "person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely af-
fected."2 34 This led the Court to its conclusion that Congress in
passing this review section
may have been of opinion that one likely to be injured by the
issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors
of law in the action of the Commission in granting the license.2 3
Neither the legislative history behind the standing provision in
the Act 236 nor the substantive claims made by the complainant in-
vited this novel ruling. Rather, the holding was a result of the Court's
refusal to recognize Sanders' own interest as a broadcast licensee, an
interest far more focused and related to the Act than the public
interest. The station asserted that insufficient advertising and talent
created the possibility that both stations would fail or provide in-
adequate service. The Court recognized this as a factor related to
the public interest in broadcasting and thus for the FCC to con-
sider.23 7 But it failed to draw the proper conclusion that Sanders
232. Jaffe, Standing Again, supra note 1, at 634; Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1368-71,
1380-83; Vining, supra note 3, at 1469-87.
233. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See also Scripps-Howard v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942); As-
sociated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
234. Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1092, as
amended 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970).
235. 309 U.S. at 477. Elaboration was soon forthcoming in Scripps-Howard v. F.C.C.,
316 U.S. 4 (1942), in which a licensed station was given public standing to complain
of electrical interference from an authorized change of frequency of another station:
"The Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights; these private liti-
gants have standing only as representatives of the public interest." Id. at 14.
236. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 522 n.81.
237. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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asserted an interest protected by statute. Apparently, the anticom-
petitive statutory interest in this case was considerably narrower and
more contingent than the ones which were familiar to the Court-
the common law right of an exclusive franchisee to be free from
new competitors and the similar, but more limited, common carrier
right requiring a showing of need for new service.23 s The most
Sanders could claim was a "right" to have its interest in avoiding
destructive competition considered and passed upon by the FCC as
one of the factors to be addressed.2 39
Although protected, this is a relative and contingent interest, en-
titled to no more than consideration and articulation as a factor in
the regulatory process. These "factor interests" are thus protected
in that they must be weighed in conjunction with other interests and
a reason offered for their disregard. But they are obviously not the
kind of legal interests that easily fit into Hohfeldian categories of
right, duty, and privilege-broader protections reflected in older
common law arrangements. 240 And the Court, while searching for
statutory rights comparable to common law relationships, failed to
recognize these factor interests as private ones. Since they did not
measure up to familiar common law rights, they were deemed to be
a part of the public interest and the plaintiffs held to be without
a private interest of their own.241
238. In the Court's view the choice was either treating broadcasters as common
carriers, affording them a property right in the license, or adhering to the principle
of free competition. It concluded that "Congress intended to leave competition in the
business of broadcasting where it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering
electrically with other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to
make his programs attractive to the public." Id. at 475.
239. See also F.C.C. v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943);
Scripps-Howard Radio v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942). The FCC in Scripps-Howard had
granted a license to WCOL without a hearing, an action which had the effect of re-
ducing the coverage of the complainant, WCPO. The issue on appeal was whether
WCPO was entitled to a hearing under the Act before a de facto modification of its
license. It sought a stay pendente lite and the circuit court certified the question
whether it had the power to issue a stay. The Court answered positively on the ground
that such power was "firmly embedded in our judicial system," id. at 13, and was
essential to avoid irreparable injury "to the public interest." Without creating new
private interests, "the purpose of the Act was to protect the public interest in com-
munications. . . . That a court is called upon to enforce public rights and not the
interests of private property does not diminish its power to protect such rights." Id.
at 14-15.
240. See W.N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923); Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant, supra note I.
241. The Court in Sanders and Scripps-Howard was opposed to interpreting the
Communications Act as creating new private rights. It feared that such a construction
would introduce notions of vested property rights in licenses and substantial immunity
from competition into the field of broadcasting. The Act and its legislative history
did indeed view these as undesirable. Concerned with these effects from broad private
rights, and thinking of private rights as necessarily broad, the Court did not entertain
the alternative of more limited statutory interests. Instead it chose to regard the
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A cause of action yardstick substituted for standing illuminates that
the general characteristics of the interests relied on by Sanders and
the more recent litigants are like those of any group presenting a
private claim for relief. Furthermore, the tradition of injury asso-
ciated with Article III standing does not warrant a new under-
standing for this litigation. In short, the "public standing" cases are
not exceptions to the judicial role of resolving private actions.
A public action theory, on the contrary, entails a broad and in-
discriminate rationale for judicial intervention which presents a host
of theoretical and practical difficulties. First, it involves a departure
from a tradition in which judicial power has not been directed at
expounding the law in favor of the interest in executive or adminis-
trative legality.242 Reflecting this tradition, Article III standing has
required something more than a litigant's interest in getting the
law declared and clarified.2 43 The public action, by implicitly ac-
cepting this interest, 244 removes most limits on litigation and in-
volves courts in an undertaking similar to rendering "advisory"
opinions. Public interest standing can skirt the Article III problem,
but at some cost to the choice of public champions and the function
of the action. 245 There are also tensions with other practices de-
veloped in private litigation, such as agency enforcement discre-
tion24 6 and the rule restricting a litigant to his own or some related
claims.247
In addition, the simplicity of public interest standing may be
illusory. It dispenses with rules for determining claims and litigants,
but substitutes others for determining the legal issues deemed im-
Act as a public statute. For a similar nonrecognition of statutory interest, see Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo.) (plaintiff without a
"'definite legal right' to be immune from . . . competition"), a"f'd mer., 350 U.S.
892 (1955).
242. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 120-23; H. WECsLER, supra note 7, at 4-15.
243. See pp. 481-88 infra.
244. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant, supra note 1, at 1043-46.
245. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note I, at 484-85, 528-31; Monaghan, supra
note 1, at 1380-83.
246. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Moog Industries v. F.T.C., 355
U.S. 411 (1958); Amalgamated Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940);
F.T.C. v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929); Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts
Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Office Employees Union v. Labor Bd.,
353 U.S. 313 (1957); Marco Sales v. F.T.C., 453 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1971). There is, however,
a clear trend toward review of administrative discretion not to exercise its jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584" (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. S.E.C., 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted,
401 U.S. 973 (1971), dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Trailways of New England v. C.A.B.,
412 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969).
247. See pp. 465-66 supra.
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portant enough to warrant this special form of review.2 48 Hence it
requires a court to articulate why environmental or consumer com-
plaints present such issues, while other grievances do not. Finally,
viewing claims involving a broad social interest as public ones may
diminish regard for the impact of the challenged action on indi-
viduals or groups and induce narrower requirements of standing
or claims in private litigation.2 49 Public standing is also a denial of
any relationship between a protected interest and the litigant assert-
ing it. Indeed a virtue of the concept is that it allows courts to de-
termine if the occasion demands judicial intervention, a discretion
which is not possible when a litigant seeks his own remedy as of
right.2 511 Although public standing protects important interests, it
does so with uncertain and vulnerable judicial power.
In spite of these difficulties, public standing, limited in its use
for several decades after Sanders,251 took on renewed vigor with the
increase in participation in the administrative process. Since this
movement began before liberalization of private standing rules, it
perhaps represents a way around restrictive barriers. Thus, the cele-
brated breakthroughs of the 1960's upholding the standing of certain
television consumers and environmental groups to participate in ad-
ministrative proceedings and to seek judicial review were made
under the auspices of standing to vindicate the public interest.21;2
248. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 486-94, 530-31; Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant, supra note 1, at 1038. See also Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1371-79.
249. One commentator has noted this experience in other countries, especially where
the attorney general's consent is necessary for the public action. S. THIo, supra note
2, at 9-10.
250. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 485-86; Jaffe, Standing Again,
supra note 1, at 637-38.
Judicial review in the public interest may also distort or alter the customary scope
of review. J. SAx, supra note 129, at 140-52; Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental
Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 612 (1970);
Vining, supra note 3, at 1475, 1496; Jaffe, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1562 (1971).
251. Public standing was used to confer standing under several acts with statutory
standing provisions very similar to the one in the Communications Act. See, e.g., Philco
Corp. v. F.C.C., 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959); Pitts-
burgh v. F.P.C., 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir.
1953); National Coal Ass'n v. F.P.C., 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The FCC sought to
restrict Sanders by insisting on a specific showing of "new injury," meaning harm
from newly authorized competition, not merely modifications, transfers, or renewals
of a license. The courts were not receptive, since there was also a public interest in
review of the latter determinations. See, e.g., Tupelo Broadcasting Co., 12 P &- F RADIO
RaE. 1250b (1955), rev'd, Granik v. F.C.C., 234 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Alvarado
Broadcasting Co. (KOAT), 10 P & F RADIO REG. 382a (1954), rev'd, Metropolitan
Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Leo Howard, 9 P & F
RADIO REG. 359 (1953), rev'd, Camden Radio v. F.C.C., 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
252. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Note, Expansion of Public
Interest Standing, 45 N.C.L. REv. 998 (1967).
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These cases supplied the keynote for a multitude of cases accom-
modating new challenges to administrative action, not only by listen-
ers and conservationists, but also by bidders for government con-
tracts, consumers, communities seeking airline service, and persons
seeking to avoid dangers from atomic energy facilities. 253 Relying on
the logic of public interest standing, some courts dropped or de-
emphasized the requirement of a particularized injury from the chal-
lenged action in favor of a bona fide organizational interest in a
problem.254 Although the Supreme Court did not accept this de-
velopment in Sierra Club v. Morton,25 the concept of public stand-
ing survived that case as an embracing rationale for judicial review.20r6
An understanding of the earlier treatment of widely-shared interests
in the administrative process, the related usages of public interest
and rights, and the dynamics of the new representation do not offer
support for regarding these interests as public ones. In the halcyon
days of untarnished agencies with new missions, the public interest
was that which agencies pursued and effectuated,257 a goal that was
separate and apart from the clamor of selfish private interest. Knowl-
edge and technology rather than interest groups would produce the
proper decision.
Characterizations of public statute and public right provided a
judicial rationale for severely restricting participation in the adminis-
trative process and judicial review. This dichotomizing of public-
private led the Court to rationalize denial of procedural rights to
unions on the theory that the National Labor Relations Act, a pub-
lic statute, conferred no protections upon the private interests of
253. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 104 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scanwell Laboratories v. Thomas, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. C.A.B., 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Citizen
Ass'n v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp.
332 (D. N. Mex. 1971); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Ala. 1971); Coalition
for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Izaak
Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg,
312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. H.U.D., 284 F.
Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
254. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965); Nader
v. Volpe, 320 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1970).
255. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
256. See note 221 supra.
257. J. LANDIS, THE ADNMNIsRAnVE PROCESS 1-30 (1938); Kaufman, Power For the
People-and by the People: The Utilities, the Environment and the Public Interest,
88 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 90, 94 (1971); Reich, supra note 128. See generally Jaffe, James
Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REv. 319 (1964).
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unions.23 8 Insulating agencies from pressure groups excluded less
organized and less traditional interests, such as consumers under a
pricing scheme2059 and listeners in broadcasting regulation,260 but did
not exclude the well-organized, regulated economic interests.
In a highly pluralistic society with many interest groups, however,
there is no "unitary public interest." Agencies must deal with a
constellation of interests which often compete with each other.2 1 The
ones primarily accounted for are those pressed upon agencies by the
parties, especially those with a large economic stake who continuously
appear before the agencies.2 62 While some think agencies are too re-
sponsive to these interests,2-0 3 others see this system as affording co-
hesively-organized groups with power their due.2 64 Commentators
also have recognized that agencies and their staffs cannot be relied
upon to delineate forcefully or present forcefully the positions of
unrepresented interests. Institutional habits of compromise as well
as staff perceptions of agency priorities render arguments for un-
represented interests bland or adulterated. 26 5 Further, there is no
one position which best advances an interest affected by a decision;
there are various positions and perspectives that accommodate con-
sumer, environmental, or producer interests. 26 This development
recognizes that none of the interests relevant to an administrative
258. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 266
(1940). A significant change of perspective can be seen in Local 283, U.A.W. v. Scofield,
382 U.S. 205, 218 (1965).
259. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939), aff'g City of Atlanta
v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 26 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C.); cf. Wright v. Central
Ky. Natural Gas Co., 297 U.S. 537 (1936); City of New York v. New York Telephone
Co., 261 U.S. 312 (1923). But cf. United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 151 F.2d
609 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
260. See, e.g., Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965), rev'd sub nora.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). See also American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648
(2d Cir. 1962); 107 U. PA. L. REV. 551 (1959).
261. See Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1188-97 (1954). See generally H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962).
262. See Crampton, supra note 219, at 526-30; Reich, supra note 128, at 1238-44.
Knowledgeable agency members have written on the subject. See Elman, Administrative
Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEo. L.J. 777 (1971); Johnson, A New
Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869 (1971). See also P. McAvoy, THE
CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1970).
263. See, e.g., Moss v. C.A.B., 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970); R. FELLMErH,
THE INTFRSTATE CO1MMERCE COMMISSION 15-22 (1970); J. SAX, supra note 129, at 61;
Johnson, supra note 262, at 895; Reich, supra note 128, at 1234-35.
264. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 261.
265. See Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public
Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 543 (1970);
Elman, supra note 262, at 789-90; Johnson, supra note 262, at 873.
266. R. WINTER, THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE VERsus THE CONSUMER 14-15 (American
Enterprise Inst. Analysis No. 26, 1972); Reich, supra note 128, at 1234; Comment,
supra note 219, at 731-32.
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decision so clearly captures the common good that it can properly
be regarded as public and left exclusively to an agency.
This should lead to discarding the dichotomy which classified in-
terests as public and private, with its corollary that individuals and
groups favored by statutory protections were merely incidental bene-
ficiaries of a public right. Instead, participation by organizations
of consumers or conservationists is now encouraged because they
may better represent these interests than a public agency.20- 7 Such
representation is necessary not because these interests are identified
with the public interest, but because they, like other factor interests,
are among the constellation of interests entitled to consideration.
One argument against this proposition is based on the widely-
shared and diffuse character of environmental or consumer interests.
It is observed that unlike the traditional plaintiff who seeks to pro-
tect his own economic welfare, litigants advancing these claims, often
represented by subsidized organizations and law firms,2-68 are ide-
ological-they challenge government action in order to protect cer-
tain shared values and prevent harm to the general good. That they
are pursuing a cause and avoiding injury to individuals is secondary,
perhaps alleged only to satisfy technical requirements. 2 9 These liti-
gants represent open-ended classes to which everyone may belong-
consumers, television listeners, or users of the environment.2' 0
This well-known and interesting viewpoint is built on some mis-
understandings about the nature of private claims in our legal sys-
tem. Legal interests are viewed as personal and private despite the
fact that the interest is widely-shared and that each individual's own
stake is small. This is because of a pervasive belief, or perhaps bias,
267. See, e.g., N.W.R.O. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Com-
munication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
See also Gellhorn, supra note 219, at 372-83; Comment, supra note 219, at 704-23.
268. See Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant, supra note 1, at 1044, where he points
out that the conservation group in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), was "heavily financed by a public spirited citizen," which al-
lowed it to function effectively as a litigant; Sedler, supra note 1, at 488-89, 497, 506-10;
Comment, supra note 219, at 730-35; Note, Citizen Organizations in Federal Adminis-
trative Proceedings: The Lingering Issue of Standing, 51 B.U.L. REv. 403, 404 (1971).
269. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant, supra note 1, at 1044; Monaghan, supra
note 1, at 1380-81; Sedler, supra note 1, at 488-89, 497.
270. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(preservation of public parkland); Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (enjoin permits for construction of the Alaska oil pipeline); McQueary v. Laird,
449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971) (prevent dangers from storage and transport of nerve
gas); Environmental Defense Fund v. H.E.W., 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (avoidance
of harmful effects from DDT in the atmosphere); Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (intervention to assure
responsible unbiased broadcasting); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 500;
Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255, 282
(1961).
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that private responsibility for vindication of self-interest fractionalizes
power and promotes independence, and that law is basically designed
with the welfare of the individual and groups in mind.
Many familiar private claims present interests and injuries that
are widely-shared and diffuse. The list includes a taxpayer's attack
on a federal tax as beyond national powers, 271 a voter's challenge
to a burden on the franchiseT27 2 or to malapportioned districting,2 73
an individual's attack on the validity of Reconstruction governments
in the South 27 4 a pupil's attack on prayers in the public schools 275
or on a system of segregated education, 27 6 a shopkeeper's challenge
to Sunday closing laws, 27 7 a pregnant woman's attack on abortion
statutes,278 an institution's challenge to the President's impoundment
of appropriated funds27 9 and a claim that the President has no in-
herent authority to discharge employees, 2s seize private property,2s
or send troops to Vietnam.2 2 These are asserted as individual claims,
but the interests are shared with a universe of taxpayers, voters, sol-
diers, females, and so forth.
Familiar procedural devices and judicial rulings are designed to
facilitate private litigation involving commonly-held interests. The
271. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
272. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
273. See, e.g., Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
274. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 85 (1868); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Courts refused
to hear such claims where a state was the complaining party. Georgia v. Stanton, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1868).
275. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
276. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
277. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961). -
278. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
279. See, e.g., Campaign Clean Water v. Ruckelshaus, 41 U.S.L.W. 2675 (E.D. Va.
June 5, 1973); American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 41 U.S.L.W. 2542 (D.D.C.
April 11, 1973); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972),
a]f'd, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Note, Protecting the Fisc: Executive Im-
poundment and Congressional Power, 82 YALE L.J. 1636 (1973).
280. Compare Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), with Meyers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
281. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); cf. New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
282. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1971) (recognizing stand-
ing on the part of private plaintiffs serving in Vietnam, but not on the part of the
state); Orlando v. Laird. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). The holdings are not uniform,
United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967),
and the Court has refused to hear cases challenging the constitutionality of the war.
See, e.g., Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979
(1972). Justiciability rather than standing appears to be the more important issue in
these cases.
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class action mechanism, especially for cases involving common ques-
tions of law or fact, reflects this objective. Although originally a
permissive joinder device by which parties who wished could have
such cases tried together, it was amended in 1966 to make judg-
ments in this class of cases binding on all members of the class who
did not request exclusion.2s 3 The rationale was to encourage law-
suits and adequate legal representation where the conduct com-
plained of extracts a small toll from a large number of persons..2 1'
Similarly liberalized intervention practices and consolidation of
multi-district litigation are methods of accommodating the com-
plexity and multiplicity of interests in modern claims for relief.2 5
Constitutional rulings protecting the litigating functions of organi-
zations, acceptance of their representative role,"-s and the trend to-
ward awarding counsel fees to lawyers in class suits28 7 reflect a recog-
nition of the need for sponsored litigation on behalf of claimants
having common interests and shared claims. These developments are
antithetical to a proposition that such interests are properly left to
the discretion of public tribunals.
Despite this background of adjudications of shared interests in
283. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment to
Rule 23, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 98, 109. See also Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co.,
425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
284. As Professor Kaplan, a drafter of the rule, put it, "For them [small claims]
the class action serves something like the function of an administrative proceeding
where scattered individual interests are represented by the government." Kaplan, Con-
tinning Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure I, 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 398 (1967); Note, Parties Plaintiff In Civil Rights
Litigation, 68 CoLuM. L. REv. 893, 899-905 (1968). Courts have generally construed
Rule 23 liberally in cases involving small monetary claims and civil rights actions.
See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supt. 509 (D. Conn. 1971); Moss v. Labe Co.,
50 F.R.D. 122 (D. Va. 1970).
285. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24. Rule 24(a)(2) was also amended in 1966 to expand the
occasions for intervention as of right. Consistent with efficiency and manageability,
there is liberal allowance of intervention. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822 (5th
Cir. 1967); Burney v. North American Rockwell Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal.
1969). See generally C. "VRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrIE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1908-31
(1972); Kaplan, supra note 284, at 401-04.
On multiple and multi-district litigation, see MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE: MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX AND MULTI-DIsTRIcT LITIGATION (2d ed. 1969). See generally Note, Ob-
servations on the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68 MICH. L. RaV.
303 (1969).
286. See, e.g., United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576
(1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). On organizational represen-
tation, see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972); cf. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
287. Compare Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1967), with Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-95 (1970). See also
Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Lee v.
Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally M. DERFNER,
A-rORNEY's FEE IN PRO BONO PUBLICO CASES (1972), and cases cited id. at i-vii.
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private claims for relief, some commentators see standing for con-
sumers and environmentalists as being outside the scope of Article
III standing. In this view tangible injuries shared by many do not
qualify as a private action within the Article III tradition of case
or controversy. The plaintiffs are ideological ones and their interest
is likened to the public interest in lawful government. Litigation
over such interests is thus analogized to the citizens' suit, the paradigm
of the public action which seeks to prevent harms to the public from
unlawful government action. Cases adjudicating widespread undif-
ferentiated harms are believed to work a modification of the Article
III barrier to the public action288 and to signal its demise.
The comparison of recent litigants with citizens as a whole vastly
overstates the scope of the claims which are often quite particularized.
For example, in the celebrated broadcasting challenge, Office of Com-
munications of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.,J -2 9 a class of
listeners in Jackson, Mississippi, protested the license renewal of a
local station on the ground of a pattern of racial bias in broad-
casting. More fundamentally, the equation of consumer and environ-
mental interests with citizen interest in lawful government is based
upon a misunderstanding of Article III as a limit upon private actions.
The tradition of standing as an element of Article III case or
controversy is itself in flux, 29 0 sharing in the complexities and va-
288. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant, supra note 1, at 1044-45; Monaghan, supra
note I, at 1379-82; Sedler, supra note I, at 488-89, 497-511.
289. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
290. The requirement of injury has long been attributed to Article III as a fairly
fixed requisite of case or controversy. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962). Re-
cently, however, the Court has emphasized that prior invocations of Article III standing
have often been blended with other self-imposed limitations and has agreed that
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), can be read as announcing a noncon-
stitutional rule of restraint. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-94, 97-99 (1968).
Flast v. Cohen introduced a further change in its holding that a federal taxpayer
had standing to challenge federal expenditures to parochial schools on the ground
that the expenditures constituted an establishment of religion prohibited by the First
Amendment. Flast purported to adhere to the tradition of requiring private injury,
but the problem is to locate the injury. The Court stressed that the challenge was
based on a specific limitation on the spending power. But it also suggested that in-
jury may be derived from the particular history behind the Establishment Clause.
Its concern with the evils from government aid to religious institutions creates a
protected legal interest in taxpayers which, like other protected interests, provides a
basis for finding injury. But it is difficult to see how a taxpayer or citizen is injured
by such expenditures or, more particularly, how the injury differs from the affront to
citizen interest that may result from unlawful government action. In other words,
saying that taxpayers have a protected interest against expenditures in violation of
the First Amendment does not seem different from saying that they have such an
interest against a particular illegality because it is illegal. The interest is in the rule
of law, the enforcement of limits.
Compare with this problem the Court's recent decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), where two white tenants of an apartment complex
sought to challenge their landlord's racial discrimination under the Civil Rights Act
of 1968. In comparison to Flast, however, there were no injury problems. The statute
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garies of standing lore generally. Certainly, however, constitutional
standing requires a showing of tangible harm to the litigant from
the action he seeks to challenge. This rule operates to disqualify
litigants whose only stake is the desire to obtain regularity of law
and administration. 291 This is not merely a method of avoiding or
restricting decisions on constitutional questions; one may not prevail
in ordinary litigation without having something at stake.
The classic expression of this requirement is found in Frothingham
v. Mellon,2 92 in which Mrs. Frothingham, suing as a federal tax-
payer, claimed that the Maternity Act of 1921 which authorized fed-
eral expenditures for reduction of maternal and infant mortality, was
in the words of Mr. Justice Sutherland, a "usurpation of power not
granted to Congress by the Constitution. ' 293 Unable to show that
were the act held invalid, either the federal tax burden or her own
tax bill would be diminished, she sued as a good Federalist who ob-
jected for reasons of political conscience to federal expenditures
shaping local programs. The Court dismissed the action, stating that
"[t]he party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able
to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained
• . . some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with peo-
ple generally."294
The Court reached the same conclusion in the recent environmen-
tal case, Sierra Club v. Morton.295 The Sierra Club, a prominent
conservation organization, sought to enjoin the granting of federal
permits authorizing construction by Walt Disney Enterprises of a
$35 million ski resort in Mineral King Valley, a semi-wilderness
area in the Sequoia National Forest. Although the Club might
can be said to create recognizable interests in white residents as well as black appli-
cants for housing. These interests are injured by discriminatory practices; deprivation
of the benefits from integrated living are both identifiable and tangible. Hence, injury
is clearly distinguishable from citizen aggrievement over unlawful practices.
Mr. Justice White's concurrence refers to an emerging viewpoint that standing, in-
cluding injury, is not an essential component of Article III case or controversy. 409
U.S. at 212. The view was seemingly approved by the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972), in which the Court stated that "where a dispute is otherwise jus-
ticiable, the question whetber the litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication
of a particular issue' . . . is one within the power of Congress to determine." 405
U.S. at 732 n.3. See text accompanying note 295 & p. 487 infra.
291. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See generally
BicKEL, supra note 2, at 119-22.
292. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
293. Id. at 479.
294. Id. at 488.
295. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Noting that the petitioner sought judicial review of ad-
ministrative action, the Court did not rely on Article III. The inquiry was whether
the Administrative Procedure Act authorized review in the circumstances. Id. at 732.
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have specified injuries to its members who used the area, it chose
to represent the public interest in conservation by describing itself
as an experienced organization with a special and informed interest
in the preservation of national parks and wilderness areas, espe-
cially the Sierra Nevada mountains. A divided Court held that this
failed to satisfy the requirement of injury in fact. The Court clearly
acknowledged that impairment of the ecology of a park is a "type
of harm" upon which standing could be based and that the Club
could represent members who might suffer injury from the project.
But the Club's offended value preference or its interest in the prob-
lem would not suffice.2 96 The case has been criticized on functional
grounds; an established organization has greater expertise and re-
sources for litigation than any user of the area.297 But insistence on
some nexus beyond concern is a concomitant of the line between
private and public actions. The Club's interest, as set forth, was
aggrievement over legality and the Court closed by invoking "De-
Tocqueville's . ..observation that judicial review is effective largely
because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction,
but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury. -" 29 8
Thus it is injury to a recognizable interest that distinguishes liti-
gants with private claims from the public litigant who sues to vin-
dicate lawful government. Operative in this tradition is the special
status of the interest in legality, not the fact that cognizable injury
is widely shared. Nothing in the requirement of injury specifies
that harms to tangible interests be highly particularized or that col-
lective harms fail to qualify. The size of the injured group is no
more relevant to satisfaction of the requirement than the severity
or kind of injury.2990 Conceivably, a potential plaintiff class could in-
clude the entire population, if, for example, the claim were that an
296. Id. at 739.
297. Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing in the alternative for acceptance of
the Court's opinion, with the condition that the Club be allowed to amend the com-
plaint (suggested but not guaranteed by the Court), or for an "expansion of our tra-
ditional concepts of standing in order to enable an organization such as the Sierra
Club, possessed, as it is, of pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized attributes and
purposes in the area of environment, to litigate environmental issues." Id. at 756-57.
Mr. Justice Brennan joined in this last alternative. Mr. Justice Douglas, in an opinion
reflecting his deep concern for environmental problems, argued that such cases should
be brought in the name of the natural object "about to be despoiled, defaced, or in-
vaded" and litigated by qualified representatives who are able to speak for the values
at stake. Id. at 741-43. See also The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 51,
234-41 (1972). On remand the Sierra Club was allowed to amend and allege that its
members use the Mineral King Valley. 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
298. 405 U.S. at 740-41 n.16.
299. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Mctropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207 (1962); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790 (1961). See generally DAvis TREATisE,
supra note 1, § 22.09-5 (Supp. 1970).
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atomic energy facility failed to meet certain statutory safety require-
ments. Everyone in the zone of danger would have a sufficient stake
in the controversy, a protected private interest, and therefore a claim
against the AEC.300 This may make an unwieldy case, but it is a case
or controversy.
While the purposes behind the case or controversy requirement
may be the subject of debate, they do not support analogizing shared
injuries with the interest in legality.301 First, the injury requirement
provides a minimal guarantee of adequate conditions for decision.
It assures two adverse parties providing both sides of a case and con-
tributes toward the presentation of concrete facts. Second, it serves
to define and fortify the institutional role of courts by combining
judicial lawmaking with the ordinary business of judging. Further,
Professor Bickel notes that the case requirement creates a time lag
between legislation and adjudication which minimizes and softens
conflict.302 Ultimately the justification for not acting on the interest
in legality may be symbolic, a part of the institutional identity of
courts necessary for widespread consent and support. Regardless of
how well the requirement of injury implements these purposes, they
are not undermined by the adjudication of widely-shared injuries
as the subject of private claims.
Confusion may arise from the manner in which courts refer to
the interest in legality. Upon finding a litigant to be without any
other interest, courts have said that he "suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally" or that the cause is one of
public concern.30 3 To infer from this that the collective character
of an interest is relevant to its insufficiency for private standing
would be error. A litigant's interest in the lawfulness of particular
government action may be shared with others but whether it is or
300. See Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 73 (1973);
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.),
motion for injunction denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971).
301. See Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971); Boyle
v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968). See also
Frankfurter, Note On Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1002 (1924). In Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), the Court overstated the contribution of injury to the
presentation of issues. Commentators have pointed out that ideological litigants as a
class may have no less of a concern with the outcome or issues and further that the
costs of litigation itself assure a commitment to the proceeding. Moreover, the com-
petent presentation of cases or issues is probably better assured by institutional litigants
with institutional lawyers than by parties with a stake in the outcome. See Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant, supra note 1, at 1037. See also DAvis Tn.EAarSE, supra note 1, § 22.04
(Supp. 1970); Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1372-74. There might be cases in which a
plaintiff's particulars are vital to informed adjudication, but they provide dubious
support for this generalization. The justification cannot be solely this instrumentalist one.
302. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 111-98.
303. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
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not is immaterial to the ruling that he is without standing. Thus,
these expressions do not provide a reason for the finding of no
standing; they describe the result. Attribution of the interest to the
public is a figure of speech, expressing the conclusion that general
law enforcement must be left to public officials or the public in
its political capacity.
The interests of consumers and environmentalists, while held in
common with many, are plainly not equivalent to a citizen's interest
in good government. To the contrary, such interests, going to mat-
ters that affect the quality of life, leisure, and health, are as tangible
and palpable as the typical fare for adjudication. People are injured
in real and recognizable ways when action despoiling parks and
woodlands is authorized, when a licensee with a poor or discrimina-
tory broadcasting record is renewed, or when an agency fails to act
upon unsafe regulated products. Vindication of these interests in the
judicial process does not require modification of claims for relief
or Article III demands. If litigants presenting these claims, as in
Sierra Club,30 4 do not show injury to themselves from government
action, Article III is a barrier. But there is nothing inherent in the
nature of the interests or their shared character that raises problems
under Article III.
The sequel to Sierra Club, United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.),30° however, suggests sev-
eral difficulties in applying the injury requirement to uncertain en-
vironmental harm and in administering it as a threshold inquiry iso-
lated from other issues in the case. Five law students, forming an
unincorporated association, SCRAP, attacked the ICC's failure to
suspend a temporary railroad surcharge of 2.5 percent on national
freight rates. SCRAP, claiming major environmental damage from
the new charges, sought to require the ICC to file an environmental
impact statement. Mr. Justice Stewart for the Court set forth a
"line of causation" "far more attenuated" than that in Sierra Club
regarding the environmental impact and injury: "a general rate in-
crease would allegedly cause increased use of nonrecyclable com-
modities as compared to recyclable goods, thus resulting in the need
to use more natural resources to produce such goods, some of which
resources might be taken from the Washington area, and resulting
in more refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the
Washington area." 300 SCRAP alleged that its members would suffer
304. 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
305. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
306. id. at 688.
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recreational and aesthetic harm as users of the natural resources in
the Washington area.
A divided Court upheld these as sufficient allegations of injury.
Geographically widespread injury was no obstacle; a contrary rule
"would mean that the most injurious and widespread government
actions could be questioned by nobody."30 7 And the "attenuated"
causation did not justify dismissal on the pleadings. The assertions
of perceptible harm were neither inconceivable nor disproven in the
court below. In contrast, Mr. Justice White in dissent found the
injuries "remote, speculative and insubstantial," indistinguishable from
a taxpayer's interest in government expenditures or a citizen's in
litigating government decisions of concern to him.30s
Because it was a dispute over pleading allegations, S.C.R.A.P.'s im-
plications for evolving rules of itanding are probably limited. But
one of its recurrent difficulties, possibly contributing to the divergent
views of the Court and the dissent, is the seeming disproportion be-
tween the slight amount of plaintiff's injury and the nationwide
scope of the claim. This may suggest that the plaintiff's purpose is to
vindicate a cause rather than to prevent harm and that a court is
called upon to decide a legal question, not a case. Neither should
figure in determination of minimal Article III injury. Litigants often
believe in the cause they present and perhaps that society will be
better off if they prevail, but such beliefs are irrelevant for Article
III standing. Motivation analysis has played no part in that deter-
mination. 30 9 Similarly the judicial role in resolving claims has not
been a pure one, since there is an element of law clarification or
vindication in the ordinary case.310 Article III simply insures that
it is not the only element.
The major difficulty in S.C.R.A.P.311 stems from the attempt to
isolate injury for threshold adjudication. The amount of injury, if
any, largely depended on the environmental impact of the surcharge,
and its proof therefore required findings on the effect of the rates
on recyclable goods, which the Court viewed as the merits. Doubt-
less it was more tolerant on standing because the district court had
not resolved this issue, finding only that the impact was sufficiently
307. Id.
308. Id. at 723.
309. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1952). For a suggested
classification of individual plaintiffs by their presumed motivation, see Sedler, supra
note 1, at 488.
310. Mr. Justice Marshall recognized this in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803).
311. 412 u.s. 669 (1973).
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probable to enter preliminary relief. Denying sufficiency of standing
allegations in these circumstances would have appeared to resolve the
merits by supposition and to abridge a litigant's day in court.312 Al-
though the issues are intertwined, the attempt to bifurcate them into
threshold standing and the merits produces confusion and piecemeal
litigation. Both of these issues are components of a claim for relief
and they are confronted in a more orderly and direct manner if
they are so considered.
S.C.R.A.P. manifests a more general problem in its approach to
injury as a separate item in a lawsuit. Increasingly litigants chal-
lenge administrative action or legislation in anticipatory proceedings,
before actual harm has been realized. Whether there is cognizable
injury and sufficient indicia of it in these circumstances requires
reference to a set of norms. These are usually the legal provisions
relied on in the claim for relief,3 13 as the Court acknowledged in
Flast v. Cohen314 when it stressed that "inquiries into the nexus be-
tween the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents
are essential to assure that he is a proper and appropriate party."
Determination of injury therefore anticipates the merits, although
under the guise of a threshold inquiry. Thus it is inconceivable that
environmental damage to parks or wilderness areas would be recog-
nized as harms to users without the prevailing array of protective
statutes. Similarly, harm to rival business from increased competi-
tion, 31 r or injury to white tenants when a landlord excludes blacks,316
is more easily established when a statute protects against such in-
juries. As the Court has observed, Congress, by means of legislation,
312. The main claim on the merits was that th ICC had failed to prepare a de-
tailed environmental impact statement, required because of the adverse effect of a
freight surcharge on the movement of recyclable goods. The lower court had issued
preliminary relief ruling that "the danger of an adverse impact [was] sufficiently real
to require an impact statement in this case." Id. at 682. Moreover, the pleadings in
this case had been drafted to satisfy the recent guidelines of Sierra Club v. Morton
and the Court was aware of this. Id. at 683-87. It can be inferred that dismissal on
the ground of standing would have manifested more hostility to environmental liti-
gation than the Court wished to convey. The standing ruling was also immaterial to
the outcome, since the case was dismissed on the ground that the ICC's suspension
power was not reviewable. Id. at 690-96.
313. See Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on Injury In Fact, 22 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 256 (1971). For a particularly good illustration of the relationship between
legal norms and the recognition of injury, see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970);
pp. 494-95 infra. See also Benn, Interests In Politics, in 60 (n.s.) PROcEEDIrNS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 123, 130 (1960).
314. 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
315. See Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
pp. 494-95 infra. See also Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dugan, supra
note 313.
316. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See note
290 supra.
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may establish the conditions for injury in fact and therefore for
Article III standing.8 17
The Constitution also may establish the appropriate conditions.
Hence, the linkage of injury and legal provisions in Laird v.
Tatum,318 in which the Court dismissed the First Amendment claims
of persons subject to army surveillance and data-gathering because
they were unable to show harm from the operation. As the Court
explained, their allegations of a "subjective 'chill' are not an ade-
quate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or
a threat of specific future harm."310 This proposition was based upon
a construction of the scope of the First Amendment and not a de-
tached or abstract inquiry into injury.
Determining cognizable injury and the necessary indicia from the
policy of statutory and constitutional guarantees is not objectionable.
It is the usual way of resolving a claim. But to do so under a mis-
leading procedural label of injury in fact fails to require focus on
relevant legal provisions and to clarify what is being decided. Use
of a threshold rubric thus entails the general problems of using pro-
cedural labels for complex substantive inquiries. Instead, a law of
claims, by requiring satisfaction of the elements of a claim for re-
lief including some form of harm to the complainant, renders
separate and threshold investigation of the injury element super-
fluous. The requirement of a claim also assures a case or controversy.
The problem of the type, degree, and directness of injuries do not
disappear, but it is confronted as the gist of the complaint, not as
some distracting and detached side-issue.
Article III aside, there is a distinction in the literature between
legislative protections for narrow and for broad classes of benefici-
aries. Where the law imposes duties for a defined and narrow class
of beneficiaries who view themselves as victims of wrongful conduct,
their complaints regarding administrative remedies should be heard
as of right. But as the class of beneficiaries becomes broader and
less differentiated, administrative enforcement may more properly be
317. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 411 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). The Court stated,
"Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion 6f which creates standing,
even though no injury would exist without the statute." This has been read to mean
that Congress may wholly dispense with the injury requirement, see Monaghan, supra
note 1, at 1381, which confuses two distinct views of Congress' authority. On another
occasion'the Court has suggested that injury is not an essential of case or controversy
and therefore Congress may authorize litigation without it. See note 290 supra. But
this statement merely signifies that statutes create interests which establish the condi-
tions for cognizable injury.
318. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
319. Id. at 13-14.
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seen as promoting a legislative norm, not as redressing individual
wrongs. Therefore, a court feels less obliged to intervene and accord-
ingly judicial review is discretionary. 320 Not only is this distinction
difficult to apply but psychological aggrievement, the sense of being
wronged, is an inadequate basis for courts to determine the existence
of claims. It is likely to lead a judge to vindicate harms that are
familiar or resemble common law wrongs, and to reject those that
are solely the product of twentieth century legislation.
Furthermore, it is questionable to assume that harms caused by
disregarding protective provisions that benefit large classes are either
not wrongs or are too modest. The vigor with which environmental
and consumer interests are pursued in litigation and the enormous
organizational activity in areas threatened by proposals with environ-
mental impact testify to actual aggrievement. For example, a dedi-
cated conservationist would not regard action despoiling his favorite
trail as merely a modest wrong to an undifferentiated group. Others
might differ but personal evaluations cannot be used to create a
hierarchy among interests which are concededly protected by legis-
lation. There are not protections and super-protections or claims
and super-claims. And there is no need for public interest standing
since the proper adjudication of claims for relief adequately imple-
ments legislative protections and also guarantees responsive agency
action.
B. Zone of Interest Standing and Claims For Relief
Assessed from the framework of the law of claims, the new tests
of standing set out in the recent Supreme Court cases321 are as un-
necessary and productive of confusion and litigation as the older
ones. Additionally they perpetuate some old difficulties and intro-
duce several new ones. As previously discussed, two problems in le-
gal interest standing were acceptance of inappropriate private law
rules32 2 and the use of a threshold concept to consider questions
more properly confronted as aspects of a claim.3 2 3 Both figured in
the cases in which the Court announced the zone of interest test
of standing.
320. Jaffe, The Individual Right To Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IowA L.
REv. 485, 528-29 (1940).
321. See Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc.
v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
322. See pp. 443-50 supra.
323. See pp. 442-43 supra.
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Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp324
and Barlow v. Collins325 were challenges by persons suffering eco-
nomic injury from government action alleged to be in violation of
federal statutes which had no provision for judicial review. In the
former, data processing companies attacked a ruling of the Comp-
troller of the Currency allowing national banks to offer data process-
ing services to their customers under a provision affording national
banks "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking."326 In Barlow tenant farmers receiving fed-
eral farm subsidies challenged a recent regulation authorizing assign-
ment of the subsidy to their landlords to secure cash rent for land.
They argued that this expansion of assignability made them dependent
on their landlords for all their supplies and that it was contrary to
a statute restricting assignments to "cash or advances to finance mak-
ing a crop. '3 27 Noting that the common law did not protect against
competition or against the mere economic consequences of govern-
ment action, the lower courts dismissed the suits. Both added some
abbreviated doubts about the statutory claims.3 28
These cases used improper rules of decision for standing, com-
bined with an offhand treatment of the merits. Instead of employing
rules associated with the components of a claim and an appropriate
rubric for such questions, the Court chose to alter the test of stand-
ing that operated on the merits. As a preface to the -newly formulated
zone of interest standard as the proper threshold test, it observed
that protected legal interest "goes to the merits" and asserted that
"the question of standing is different." 329 The new test of standing,
after injury in fact, was "whether the interest sought to be pro-
tected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." 330 The protected legal interest standard was apparently
left unmodified for application after the standing issue is decided.
Although intended not to implicate the merits of a claim,331 the
zone of interest test in these two cases deals with merit issues. Can-
vassing the entire statute and legislative background for indicia of
324. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
325. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
326. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 157 n.2.
327. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. at 160.
328. Barlow v. Collins, 398 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1968); Association of Data Processing
Service Orgs. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675, 678 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 837, 843
(8th Cir. 1969).
329. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 153, 156.
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protective intent 3 2 necessarily involved a preliminary examination of
the merits and a forecast of the strength of the claims, points objected
to by Mr. Justices Brennan and White in their dissent from the zone
of interest standard. 33 3 The provisions invoked by the Court for
standing, 334 though not the ones authorizing the challenged action,
were of crucial significance in establishing statutory protection. Since
they were central to actual protective intent as part of the claim,
they of course also satisfied arguable intent or arguable presence in
the zone of interest.
This indicates that the Court has not exorcised the spirit of the
merits from the threshold inquiry. On the contrary it has reintro-
duced the ghost in the more troublesome wrapping of prejudgment.
It has authorized a new preliminary proceeding in which a court sur-
veys the relevant legal materials for a zone of interest before focusing
upon the claims for relief. Such initial inquiries separated from the
merits pose a series of hazards: the risk of an impressionistic or sum-
mary survey of the merits influencing the seemingly threshold de-
cision or, alternatively, prejudicing the later exploration of the claims
on the merits; the danger of ill-focused or undeliberated determina-
332. In both cases establishing protective intent was complicated because the statu-
tory provisions directly in issue were unrevealing. In Data Processing the incidental
powers clause under which the Comptroller had acted had survived intact from the
original Bank Act of 1864 and provided slim support for protective intent. Act of
June 4, 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 101. The Court found the necessary concern in-
stead in the legislative history of § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962,
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (Supp. IV 1968). Similarly in Barlow, the assignment provision was old
and cryptic; the Court primarily found the intent in another provision which instructed
the administrator to "provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants."
7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(10) (Supp. IV 1968).
333. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice White, dissented from the Court's
two.-part test for standing in favor of confining the standing inquiry to actual harm
or injury in fact, referred to as the constitutional standard. All other references to a
plaintiff's interest and protective legislative intent were relevant to reviewability and
the merits. "Before the plaintiff is allowed to argue the merits, it is true that a
canvass of relevant statutory material must be made . . . . But the canvass is made, not
to determine standing, but to determine an aspect of reviewability, that is, whether
Congress meant to deny or to allow judicial review of the agency action at the in-
stance of the plaintiff." 397 U.S. 159, 169 (1970) (emphasis in original). They explained
that reviewability is concerned with not only whether agency action is entirely con-
clusive but "whether the particular plaintiff then requesting review may have it."
Id. at 169 n.2 (emphasis in original). While seemingly relying on congressional intent
as to reviewability, the dissenters invoked as the "governing principle" the presumption
articulated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), that "judicial
review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there
is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress." The rest, a
protected legal interest and agency invasion, are for the merits. This alignment of
factors, they argued, would minimize prejudgment and ambiguity "by clearly severing,
so far as possible, the inquiries into reviewability and the merits from the determi-
nation of standing." 397 U.S. at 174-76.
The approach recommended in this article is consistent with many of the arguments
in this dissent. The point of departure, however, is its endorsement of a preliminary
inquiry attached to reviewability. See pp. 496-97 infra.
334. See note 332 supra.
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tion due to the vagueness of the standard; and the breeding of ap-
peals on preliminary issues with the consequent premature termina-
tion of the judicial process and long delays in deciding the merits.
In sum, there is, as Mr. Justice Brennan expressed it, "the possibility
that judges will use standing to slam the courthouse door against
plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claim." 33z
The Court has sought to obviate these dangers and to attenuate the
relationship to the merits by redefining the zone standard in later
cases to require little more than a statement of an interest and il-
legality which are arguable from the face of the statute. It has ruled
out references to legislative history in determining the zone336 and
has manifested a presumption in favor of standing. Whether seen
as a standard of arguable claims or as a preview of the merits, zone
of interest standing appears to serve no intelligible function. Indeed
it is its cloudy purpose that renders application uncertain and dif-
ficult, so much so that one commentator has asserted that many
courts have given up the attempt.33 7
It has, moreover, created confusion over what is required for pre-
vailing on the merits. Satisfaction of legal interest standing entitled
one to relief upon proof that administrative action was invalid. Since
legal interest is replaced by the zone standard as the test of standing,
courts might conclude that satisfying its requirements should have
the same effect. Thus, the only issue on the merits would be validity
of administrative action. Since a minimal showing of arguable statu-
tory protection is sufficient for zone standing, this view would alter
claims against agencies by eliminating legal interest requirements,
such as actual protective intent. This unique principle of liability
for administrative agencies does not have a counterpart in any area
of private or public claims for relief. By affording relief to most
persons affected by invalid agency action, it authorizes purposeless
and, in view of the many impacts of agency action, practically bound-
less interferences with agency decisionmaking. 338 Without a more
335. 397 U.S. at 178 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Vining, supra note 3, at
1522-36.
336. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam). After remand for
reconsideration in light of Data Processing and Barlow, 397 U.S. 315 (1970), the First
Circuit reaffirmed its previous denial of standing: "Under any standard, plaintiffs have
no standing. They have produced no scintilla of evidence tending to show that Con-
gress was specifically concerned with the competitive interests of travel agencies." 428
F.2d 359, 361 (Ist Cir. 1970). In reversing, the Court explained that legislative history
was not relevant and that § 4 was not limited to protection of data processors. 400
U.S. 45, 46 (1970).
337. Sedler, supra note 1, at 486-94, 511. See also DAvis TEXT, supra note 1, § 22.07.
338. See NI. SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 123; Jaffe, Standing Again, supra note 1,
at 636-37.
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explicit mandate for this result than the Court has afforded, zone
standing should not relieve a litigant from proving legal protection
in addition to the arguable variety.
The proper initial inquiry is into a litigant's legal interest under
principles of claim and not merely arguable presence in a zone. In
view of familiar procedural motions for testing claims,33 9 neither a
standard of arguable claims nor preview of protective intent is a
helpful substitute for the determination of legal interest at an early
and appropriate stage of a lawsuit. Utilizing such motions for issues
of claim does not entail needless determinations of administrative
legality nor dismissals on preliminary grounds or multiplicity of
issues. Since these determinations are openly on the merits, there is
no danger of prejudgment or of abbreviated, ill-focused consideration.
In short, zone of interest standing is not a screen that serves any
purpose that is not better served by the requirement of protected
legal interest as part of a claim for relief. Persons favored by statu-
tory protections, those representing them under principles of jus
tertii and persons entitled to protection under judicially formulated
principles are assured their day in court.
Conclusion
We have long thought it necessary to create special procedural
rules for judicial review of agency action, while, paradoxically, un-
critically applying substantive rules of decision derived from quite
different areas of litigation. Consequently, the development of a
corpus of public common law governing claims against the govern-
ment has been impeded by the failure to recognize its appropriate-
ness in suits against agencies.
This article has argued that clarity would be served if we con-
ceived of standing as involving the recognition of claims against the
government. It might then be appreciated that familiar rules of ac-
tionability and notions of legality, in conjunction with ordinary pro-
cedural practices, render a need for such opaque concepts as standing
highly questionable. A proper incidence of judicial intervention and
relief is better achieved through the elaboration of claims against
agencies.
339. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (motion for judgment on pleadings); 12(b) (motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); 56 (motion for
summary judgment).
